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## **UKRAINIAN PEASANTRY OF NADDNIPRIANSCHYNA AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH – FIRST DECADES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN RUSSIAN NATIONAL DISCOURSE**

Relevance of the topic is justified by the need to overcome the discrepancies that exist between the tasks set before the historical science, and the readiness of Clio's professional employees to give them competent answers. These ones, undoubtedly, include the understanding of the involvement processes of the peasantry of Naddniprianschyna into national (wider – modern) projects which was typical for the intellectual community at the dawn of the nineteenth – twentieth centuries, in conditions when the intelligentsia itself overcame the difficult, multi-pronged, and thus even more complicated, quite often the confrontational process of «nationalization». However, a systematic analysis of the historical development of Ukrainian society has not been carried out from the point of view in national historiography.

The Soviet historiography, including its Ukrainian segment, was not concerned with the problems that are nowadays considered to relate to the paradigm of social modernization. It can still be classified as socio-cultural or cultural-anthropological, since it is a question of recognizing culture in its broadest sense as a specific subject of history. Such detachment was not accidental. After all, the «Marxist-Leninist» research doctrine of interpretation was determined and entirely dependent on the so-called «economic determinism». It turned out that the «silent peasantry», which, however, at the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth century has already «become more talkative», was concerned only with economy and welfare. Usually, the only thing it allegedly was doing was «seeking salvation from hunger and poverty». Moreover, it was inclined to understand the main tendency of historical development – «only in the course of a decisive revolutionary struggle a better destiny can be achieved». It is easy to notice that such methodological approach was a failure according to a number of unjustified conventions and speculative considerations. However, its logic turned out to be surprisingly tenable, which will be traced in the peasant studios of Ukrainian Post-Soviet researches. It will be difficult for them to abandon the stereotypical view that socio-economic and political factors have lost the role of absolute priority in the preparation of known (or artificially promoted) «historical events and processes».

Much more generous here has been contemporary Russian historiography, focused on the relevant political order. In recent decades, many publications have appeared under the logo of «popular science publications», which are clearly dominated by neo-imperial discourse. One of such interpreters of the history, the publicist Alexander Shyrokorad, particularly writes that «the language spoken in the nineteenth- in the early twentieth century by the peasants of Kyiv province ...was a Surzhyk». Deliberately emphasizing on the absence of a «pure language» among the Ukrainian peasants, he actually attempts to «legitimize» the russification of part of the indigenous population for several centuries, clearly exaggerating the phenomenon itself. The publicist interprets it using numerous inaccuracies and fakes.

Therefore, the historiography of the topic of the study is quite vast. However, publications on this issue are increasingly contrasting with those requirements that are facing the historical (human) sciences. In addition, virtually all works that at least somehow represent the stated topic of the study are characterized by ignoring or underestimating the peasant «component of history».

Nowadays, a sophisticated methodology is needed for studying complex social phenomena and processes. It should cover not only one cognitive side, be represented by a selective paradigm, but also take into account the whole complex of epistemological approaches and practices. According

to T. Evseeva, «the application of modernization approaches towards the assessment of historical events requires, first of all, a comprehensive study of society, comparison and establishment of the relation of innovation and tradition influence on the development of...phenomena in many aspects».

**Keywords:** Naddniprianschyna, peasantry, discourse, modernization, village.

The fact of existence at the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth century of Great Ukraine, or rather Naddniprianschyna village within the Russian Empire draws an attention to several aspects. Firstly, to the village itself, its inhabitants, whereas the broadest – socio-cultural dimension, including the processes of modernization, which were then significantly revived. Secondly, the formation and peculiarities of the Russian national discourse of this village, which, considering its essence and forms of expression, we will identify as imperial and, more rarely, chauvinistic. Third, we will take into account the full range and experience of interpretative practices of these phenomena, including the achievements of historiography and political and propaganda technologies. However, the main, so to speak, «storyline» of the analysis is nevertheless connected with the Russian national (chauvinistic) discourse.

The purpose of exploration is an investigation of the “inclusion” process of Naddniprianschyna (ethnically narrower – Ukrainian) peasantry in the Russian national discourse of the dawn of the nineteenth-twentieth century, in view of its character, tendencies of transformation and possible historical modifications.

It should be noted at the outset: the upper chronological boundary of scientific search goes beyond the first years of twentieth century, which is caused by the task of a deeper understanding of both the studied phenomenon and its closest historical perspectives. Therefore, such content analysis is required, which brings together different historical epochs, combined with cultural (mental), ideological and political peculiarities derived from them. The «unifying» factor in our study is nationalism, which, however, can hardly apply for a monopoly of this role, because «to get rid of the political systems before and after 1917 as distinct ones», other phenomena, such is religiosity can be used<sup>1</sup>.

Choosing nationalism as a kind of criterion of «the existence of a continuity form...that crosses historical barriers», we pay attention to the narrower phenomenon of historical transformation – political<sup>2</sup>. According to popular interpretative interpretations today, it can be imagined as a transition from the decline of theocracy to the formation of totalitarianism.

Since the issues outlined above have already been put on the agenda in historiography, let us pay attention only to the one aspect that has remained unexplored, instead the author is interested first of all: how did these transformations affect the historical fate of the Ukrainian peasantry of Naddniprianschyna? At the same time, we will take into account the presence in the proposed reflections (or influences of them) of the views of historians who somehow «press» their culture of the comprehension and development of relevant knowledge.

The historian's presence in the text usually goes unnoticed. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, how apologists of the materialist understanding of history will acknowledge Marxism-Leninism as a form of «universal political principle of nationalism», or rather, of the Russian great-power chauvinism<sup>3</sup>. It is not an easy task for those who sympathize with Western European historiography, because they will have to face criticism of the authoritative researcher of nationalism B. Anderson, and it will be difficult to unconditionally agree with the reasoning of the scientists who, as they say, «nationalism turned out to be a Marxist theory».

So, countless peasantry in the Naddniprianschyna in the first decades of the twentieth century had to undergo an inconspicuous transformation for themselves – from the Orthodox subjects of the Russian monarchy to citizens (by many characteristics purely formal) of the «nationalist» (chauvinistic) state – the Soviet Union. However, it was accompanied by the only difference that earlier its inner world was consecrated by the «shadow state» of the ROC, and after – by the Communist Party led by chief<sup>4</sup>. True, Byzantinism, the mental filling of both political regimes, remained almost unchanged.

<sup>1</sup> Орищенко, Р. (2019). *Релігійний світ українських селян другої половини ХІХ-першої третини ХХ ст.* Черкаси: Вертикаль.

<sup>2</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці ХІХ-у першій третині ХХ ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 152-178.

<sup>4</sup> Орищенко, Р. (2019). *Релігійний світ українських селян другої половини ХІХ-першої третини ХХ ст.* Черкаси: Вертикаль.

Invisibility and other peculiarities of this transformation were caused by a number of circumstances. T. Yevseeva rightly draws attention to such a factor as «the inheritance of the main features of the political culture of theocracy by communist Russia / USSR...»<sup>1</sup>. Tragically, in its turn, the stressful events of the First World War, the revolutionary and national liberation competitions, the Ukrainian peasantry of the Naddniprianschyna experienced being a part of a multinational empire. In other words, it almost did not feel the alternative – the principle of self-determination of nations, which at that time «conquered» the population of most countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

We are also interested in the opinion of foreign researcher Liah Greenfeld. In her book, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, she is critical of Russian national discourse. The author notes that «the ingredients of the Russian national consciousness and the definition of the Russian nation were already present by 1800. Between that date and 1917 the components of this living, self-proliferating whole were in many ways articulated, refined, reconceptualized, and acted out – but never essentially modified. I do not see one single exception to this generalization among the multitude of extraordinary, complex people who participated in this process. The cognitive construct born out of the anguish and humiliation of the eighteenth-century elite became the identity of its nineteenth-century descendants; it defined them; they could no more escape it that jump out of their skin; and when it was not reflected in their writings, it was reflected in their lives»<sup>2</sup>.

The educated elite played a significant role in the imperial national discourse. There were also oppositions and deification of the people, which, of course, was far from reality. Liah Greenfeld understands this as: The nation was (1) defined as a collective individual, (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood and soil, and (3) characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit. The spirit of the nation resided in the «people», but, rather paradoxically, was revealed through the medium of the educated elite, who, apparently, had the ability to divine it. The rejection of the common thinking individual, which expressed itself in the glorification of his opposite, the community, also led to the emphasis on special, uncommon individuals, the prophets and divines of the national spirit, and as a result the adoration of the «people» frequently found its counterpart in elitism and contempt for the dumb masses. The special individuals, who knew what «people» wanted, naturally had the right to dictate to the masses, who did not know. Russian nationalism was ethnic, collectivistic, and authoritarian<sup>3</sup>.

Our appeal to the services of the comparative method is fully justified, at least in view of the need to find out the real degree of «involvement» of the Ukrainian peasantry in the Russian national discourse of the first decades of the twentieth century. Here the author is guided by the idea that the Bolsheviks almost «completely inherit the tradition and stereotypes of the political culture of theocracy», «will continue the merger of the nation and the empire, started by Peter I»<sup>4</sup>. Since the beginning of the twentieth century the peasantry will not have time to modernize, for the most part it will remain in its traditional (patriarchal) state, it will be mentally dependent on such factors as 1) the emperor (that is, the «tsar» as the bearer of the total power, the source of law, the absolute legislator, at the same time the one who controls himself solely by the «criteria of God's court»); 2) the institutions of control – the Synod, the Ober-Procurator, and his apparatus organizations and political unions; 3) an extensive system of functionaries, including local church clergy, local government representatives; 4) the legally formalized attachment to the ROC, the persecution of dissenters or those who dared to deviate from Orthodox (Orthodox-Byzantine) dogmas as criminals, 5) an algorithm for Russification of rural people based on a combination of two seemingly opposite political structures – a modern nation and a dynastic empire; it was accomplished through the institutions of education, culture, army, more or less successfully claiming the erasure of the facets «between empire and nation», «throne and proletariat»; etc.; 6) religious processions with icons and corrugations for the glorification of the «Tsar-Father», «Fatherland», etc.; 7) personal involvement in the «protection of the purity of universal Orthodoxy» (as an alternative to the concentration of the peasant community on immanent traditional feelings, in the perspective – Ukrainian national priorities); 8) the authority of the Metropolitans of Kyiv, actually the Metropolis, at that time the foundations of the sacred genealogy of «Third Rome as an empire»; in fact, it is said that the malorussian (potentially – Ukrainian) peasantry was a hostage of its own dependence

<sup>1</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці XIX – у першій третині XX ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

<sup>2</sup> Greenfeld, L. (1993). *Nationalism: fiveroadstomodernity*. Harvarduniversitypress: Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці XIX-у першій третині XX ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

on the Metropolis of Kyiv as a material embodiment of the myth of «all-Russian unity», that is, the ideological construction that united the history of the dynasty with the collective past of the community.<sup>1</sup> In this way, the Russian authorities solved the «Ukrainian issue». We are dubious to say how effective it was, considering the fact that the political using of the confessional (for the Bolsheviks – atheistic) identification only partially resolved this issue, that is, it required constant struggle with alternative varieties of it.

It should be borne in mind that ever since the Age of Enlightenment, the idea of the possibility of creating a «new society» and the education of a «new person» was spreading on a scientific basis<sup>2</sup>. In other words, social engineering, which will be so vividly demonstrated by the Bolsheviks in their policy of «building communism», has been observed before.<sup>3</sup> Besides, the period of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century became a significant period in history, meanwhile a hostile attitude toward religion and the church was relatively intense in the intellectual environment, at least partially. Secularization of public sentiment, however, did not mean de-Russification. The previously formed legal traditions and political culture proved to be «the most appropriate mechanisms for the transmission and assimilation of national traditions» to preserve the Russian empire, a way of «establishing long-term links between society (peasantry – Y. P.) and the state to ensure the people's loyalty to the authority, as well as the nature of self-reflection and the official ideological image of the empire»<sup>4</sup>.

It is important to understand that the Ukrainian peasantry of the Naddniprianschyna was in the orbit of Russian national discourse, both as an ethno cultural (malorussian) and territorial, that is, actually Naddniprianschyna phenomenon. The fact is that during the so-called «synodal period» lasting two centuries, that is, from the time of Petro I and I. Mazepa, the Russian national-state ideology «synthesized two inherently opposite legal principles: theocracy and territorialism»<sup>5</sup>. On this basis, there was a modernization of the society of the late imperial period, including the peasantry, which was still the absolute demographic majority. However, the ideological concept – the creation, in scientific terminology, of the Russian modern nation on the principle of «one state, one church (culture, people)» – was missing a number of weaknesses. Often disregarding them, ideologists emphasized the «canonical concept», which envisaged the interaction and coexistence of «priesthood and kingdom»<sup>6</sup>. In this form, both the Divine and the mundane seem to have come from a single source, forming a certain mental-ideological synthesis. Although the equivalence of state and ecclesiastical power had long been violated, this controversy was sought to correct on the principles of «love and justice», which, of course, did not undermine, but rather strengthen, the autocratic foundations of the Russian monarchy.

However, the theocracy, as a circumstance and the mechanism for the Russification of the malorussian peasant community, was clearly insufficient to achieve the set of goals. Therefore, the apologists for the inviolability of autocracy and empire counted not on theological aspect, but territorial. In particular, state decisions and processes of influence were more important than church sermons. The tradition of expanding their holdings as a top priority of public policy has «worked» here at full capacity. Now it had to combine such factors as absolute monarchial (dictatorial) power, territory and nation. This «new synthesis», in turn, was assigned to subjugate and regulate the lives of millions of underlings, among which one of the «leading» places was given to the malorussian rural population. Actually, without this «object», the scheme would obviously work, but why it would be necessary to look for «new material», if the experience of the middle – second half of the nineteenth century request, associated with the implementation of the project of the «great Russian nation», fully satisfied such request<sup>7</sup>.

Within the framework of the Russian national discourse that emerged in the aftermath of the decade, the malorussian peasant community was losing its identity, moreover, the moral right to its manifestation,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 152-178.

<sup>2</sup> Филиппов, Б. А. (1996). *Государство и церковь: детерминанты политики. Церковь и государство в русской православной и западной латинской традиции. Материалы конференции. Санкт-Петербург, 22-23 марта 1996*, 126-140.

<sup>3</sup> Скотт, Дж. (2005). *Благими намерениями государства. Почему и как проваливались проекты улучшения условий человеческой.* Москва: Университетская книга.

<sup>4</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці ХІХ-у першій третині ХХ ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Миллер, А. И. (2000). «Украинский вопрос» в политике властей и русском общественном мнении (вторая половина ХІХ в.). Санкт-Петербург: Алетейя.

and to a great extent in linguistic, cultural and artistic form, but above all in any socio-political form. Since «due to the church in consciousness of the underlings the concept of the total power of the emperor was formed», «a deep adaptation of this concept in political culture removed from his» sacred person... responsibility for the fate of the people who inhabited the empire<sup>1</sup>. They were aimed to take care of themselves. The simultaneous creation of the Ukrainian national discourse was meant to imply a conflict which, however, was not always activated by the intransigence of the parties. Agreeing with the notion that «the principle of the sacred totality of imperial power became one of the factors that made the transition from autocracy to Soviet totalitarianism quite organic», it should be clarified: the destruction of the aforementioned ethnic and national identity of the malorussian (Ukrainian) peasantry under the rule of the Bolsheviks will occur at a relatively higher level of modernization.

Still, life did not stand still. In the first decades of the twentieth century Russian national discourse, while remaining «true» to its imperial essence, has evolved. Adopted on April 23, 1906, and in force until the February Revolution of 1917, the «Basic State Laws» were intended to regulate relations between the imperial power and the representative agencies, the State Council and the State Duma, in accordance with the manifesto of October 17, 1905. The stable traditions of political culture, which did not recognize any «freedom» of subordinates, minimized the effectiveness of self-government, remained «a convenient tool for the exercise of autocracy of their power in the empire...»<sup>2</sup>. This meant that the revolution of 1905-1907 changed almost nothing in the state attitude towards the Ukrainian peasantry, its perception, understanding, etc. Known since 1834, the Uvarov's formula of «nationality» continued to determine the assimilation policies for the «malorussian tribe». And this is when «the Russian Orthodox peasantry received the support of a free in the national sense of development»<sup>3</sup>.

Speculating on the ideas of Orthodox monotheism, also written in the imperial system of the past, the consequences of long-term incorporation and earlier partial assimilation of Ukrainian, official St. Petersburg, its ideological and propaganda outpost – the ROC did not even consider it necessary to carry out towards the Naddniprianschyna peasantry (about half represented by the once were free Cossacks) denationalization or, so to say, purposeful financing at the expense of the special capital of the Synod, as was done against other national communities, the so-called «foreigners». Despite the need to specifically «protect» the Ukrainian peasantry, the government, however, meticulously regulated its attitude to it because of its neglect of ethnic and historical features in the redistribution of the canonical territory. The selection of candidates for the Bishop's Departments, as well as the ordination of priests and deacons, was «a sure way of Russification the subjects and unifying their ecclesiastical consciousness»<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, the Naddniprianschyna peasantry, which had already remembered Cossack liberties for several generations, and by and large was a native speaker of a distinct ethnic Russian culture, could not count on other forms of respect for its language, other features of their identity.

The situation with the peasants (former nobility, etc.) from the non-Orthodox denominations was somewhat more complicated, but the strict state regulation of the «will of fate» by the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the Department Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions did its job. In general, «the processes of forming a...political (Russian – Y. P.) nation on an Orthodox basis» did not give the Ukrainian peasantry a chance for their own national assertion<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, such alternatives were not accepted because they were considered inadmissible in the context of many ideas and considerations. For example, in logical context of «the charisma of a single world empire». The belief in the «unity» of velykorussian and malorussians, who speculated on Orthodoxy, was based on the gendered ideals of the former Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire. Therefore, the Russian national discourse meant not only «just» encroachment on the territory of the Naddniprianschyna, but also the same «morally justified» inclusion of its population in the ideological «theory of universality»<sup>6</sup>. For this purpose, quite real efforts were made both by secular ecclesiastical authorities, especially in the atmosphere of public expectations of Great (First World) war. The Russian Empire needed an internally reconciled, spiritual united country (community), without which its subsequent external expansion was a failure. In this particular case, there are significant differences in the views of the

<sup>1</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці XIX-у першій третині XX ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

Black Hundred monarchists, liberal conservatives (O. Guchkov, V. Vernadskyi, P. Milukov, O. Rodzianko, S. Sazonov, P. Struve, etc.), and in the mental plane of the representatives left parties (essery, Menshikovs, Bolsheviks). What is more, such policy was supported by the public at large.

Therefore, the peasantry of the Naddniprianschyna legion did not stand on the sidelines of great politics. It was taken into account and used. And it doesn't matter – were they perceived solely as Orthodox people or just subjects? We use the reference of T. Yevseeva and quote the words of Archbishop of Kharkiv, Antonii, dating from 1916: «At present war our people (that is, the Orthodox rural people – Y. P.) are looking at the liberation of Christianity from the invasion of heretics and Mohammedans, and the ultimate goal is the liberation of St. Constantinople with the church of St. Sophia and Jerusalem with the Holy Sepulcher. All this is of great interest not only to our soldiers, but also to large extent residents of Russian and malorussian villages»<sup>1</sup>. This view seems typical and representative of our understanding of Russian national discourse of the time. Although, obviously, it was not completely universal, due to the reason that there were other, less popular interpretive models. One of the well-known internal alternatives here belonged to the views of Vladimir Soloviov (1853-1900), who had earlier developed the idea of Russian ecumenism. It proved to be of little satisfaction to royal censorship, which was particularly alarming for the thesis of the «universal family of Christ». The authorities and its numerous apologists sought something opposite: «To bring peace and blessings to the family of people (Ukrainian first of all – Y. P.)» having previously taken them under their patronage<sup>2</sup>.

What is the function assigned to this Naddniprianschyna peasantry? It was, according to the plan of Russian ideologues, to be content with involvement in the expansion of living space: until 1917 – fighting for the universal Orthodox empire, after – for the world proletarian revolution. In both cases, the peasantry had to be in the secondary, supporting roles of big politics. Speaking of wartime, he was supposed to be «cannon fodder». In this regard, the first decades of the twentieth century little changed in the traditional (since the declaration of the empire of 1721) Russian doctrine: the Ukrainian peasantry had purposeful «merge» with the Russians, thus demonstrating loyalty to the dynasty (soon – «proletarian» leaders) and earlier – Orthodoxy in its Byzantine-Moscow variety.

The author shares the opinion of historians who believe that the Russian imperial (as a national) project of the late imperial era was in crisis («crisis of monarchial power was expressed in the inability of the emperor to make firm decisions»), which was combined with the «crisis of faith, which was based on»<sup>3</sup>. Indeed, discrepancies in the views and the position of the official authorities and the public, not to mention the mood in the peasant environment, remained palpable. The only political nation was far away – the popularity of the monarchial system of government, especially since the outbreak of World War I, was much better, and the authority of the church was steadily falling. Church reforms projects, despite the fact that much attention had been paid to them (in all convocations of the State Duma, had been dealt with by a relevant commission), did not provide adequate responses to the challenges of the times.

Some of these projects were well thought out. Without going into the substantive analysis, it should be noted that in the case of their approval and consistent implementation between the state, the church and the subjects, an «intermediate link – civil society» should have been formed<sup>4</sup>. However, this is rather a hypothetical assumption, since neither the Russian authorities nor the traditional village culture were ready to implement such ideas. Out of a sense of hopelessness, some officials suggested to Europeanize the situation – to separate the church from the state; however, such a move would lead to a radical revision of the entire administrative role of the state, which contradicted the stereotypes of thinking, the moods of different strata and layers of the exposed population.

Thus, the Ukrainian peasantry of the Naddniprianschyna region of the late nineteenth – first decades of the twentieth century, which the author presents as a certain historical socio-cultural community, was located, more precisely, falling into several national discourses. Russia's discourse was not perhaps the most powerful in intellectual potential because it relied on state support. Changing many of the priorities that took

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Сак, К. В., Петров, Ю. А., Круглов, В. Н. (ред.) (2018). *Образы позднеимперской России в драме К. Р. «Царь иудейский»*. История России с древнейших времен до XXI века: проблемы, дискуссии, новые взгляды. *V Всероссийская научно-практическая школа-конференция молодых ученых*. Москва: Ин-т рос. истории РАН, 156-168.

<sup>4</sup> Євсєєва, Т. М. (2009). Ментальні особливості модернізації політичної системи Російської імперії та СРСР наприкінці XIX-у першій третині XX ст. (український контекст). *Український історичний журнал*, 5, 152-178.

place in the late imperial period, including the recognition of the «Ukrainian» identity of the peasantry, did not mean abandoning its interpretative essence (as «part of the Russian people»). In this respect, the vector of confrontation, which is difficult to call a discussion, has shifted from a peasant space to an intellectual one. According to the terminology widely used then and later, it is known as «Ukrainian separatism». This and its related phenomena require additional efforts by researchers.

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