

Ihor Rymar

National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, Ukraine

PRECESSION OF SIMULACRUMS OF THE GREAT TERROR AND DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND (1936-1938)

The article attempts to analyze quite complex and versatile process – the Great Terror of 1936-1938 and the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland (CPP) through the prism of the postmodernist concept of the French philosopher J. Baudrillard about the simulacrum. Using some of the basic concepts of Baudrillard– the simulacrum and the dissuasion, and also on the basis of a published archival documents related to this period, and monographic studies, is given the characteristic to one of the main tools of terror – ‘purge’; the process of the deployment of the Great Terror, its approach and the involvement of the Third International and foreign Communists in Moscow, in the process of repression and ‘purge’, is followed; an attempt is being made through the prism of the postmodernist approach to find out the reasons for the elimination of the ruling elite of the CPP that was in Moscow and the complete dissolution of the party that was a part of the Third International from the moment of its uprising. The obtained results allow expanding the existing field of interpretations and explanations of the causes and motives of the Great Terror, the place occupied by the Third International and the CPP in this process.

Keywords: Comintern, Communist party of Poland (CPP), the purge, the Great Terror, simulacrum, precession, dissuasion.

*Why such a great fuss over the trial.
Incomprehensible. An atmosphere has been
created of extreme unrest among the population,
mutual suspicion, denunciations, and so forth.
Trotskyism has been killed–why such
a campaign?
Diary of G. Dimitrov. 02.02.1937*

This very impression caused the trial of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev group at G. Dimitrov, the general secretary of the Third International (Comintern), and his friends, L. Feuchtwanger and M. Osten, who had dwelled in Moscow since the end of 1936. The record of December 18, 1936, when L. Feuchtwanger and M. Osten sat in the court, attests the lack of understanding of the reasons for the court, the reasons for the following sentences as shooting, lack of evidence, except for the accusations, like ‘when the Soviet regime is so powerful that it has nothing to fear from people sitting in prisons’¹.

Approximately the same impression arises among the historians when they take up the study of the Great Terror of 1936 – 1938. Absurdity, mass fear, distrust, when anyone can be accused of being ‘the nation’s enemy’, or even worse, being ‘appointed’ to be this kind of enemy; the struggle of all against all, when in a relative safety are only those who occupy the highest positions in the hierarchy of power and those who perform the role of an obedient instrument in the hands of the first; absolute vulnerability, total precession of simulacrums, when the image of an imaginary enemy precedes and stimulates the search and gives the rise up to the real enemy, which actually doesn’t exist.

The precession itself, prepositions of similar objects, simulating, transmitting, depicting or representing reality, and *dissuasion*, as it seems to be true, laid the foundation for the 1936-1938

¹ Dimitrov, G. (2003). *The Diary. 1933-1949*. Yale: Yale University Press, 44.

repressions. It is the same precession and *dissuasion* that we find when reading documents relating to the repression of the Comintern representatives and dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland (CPP), the massacres of an old party members of the fraternal Communist Party, who have never been in opposition to the current regime or who knew too much and could be unreliable.

The problem of systematic analysis of each of the elements associated with the Great Terror of 1936-1938 does not lose its relevance, despite the powerful array of the processed material, and leaves a field for new approaches and interpretations. Taking this into consideration, the relevance of this article is to investigate the Great Terror of 1936-1938 and the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party as a component of the purges in the Third International and repressions against foreigners (Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Germans, etc.) as a part of the great precession of simulacrum in the period from 1936 to 1938. The precession of simulacrum, as something that can not arise and exist in isolation from reality in its entirety and complexity, demands systematic, multifactorial analysis of the causes and motives of the Great Terror of 1936-1938 and the elimination of the CPP in 1937.

The great terror, as a global phenomenon, encompassed the entire population of the USSR, all layers of society, including foreigners and political migrants, all structures and levels. The study of the Great Terror, the discovery of its causes and actions on the social structures and the party involved many well-known scholars, both Western and Russian. Summing up their achievements, the Russian researcher, the doctor of philosophical sciences, prof. A. Medushevsky¹ distinguishes seven main positions (psychological, institutional, functional and sociological approaches, factor of personality, multivariate analysis and refusal of rational explanation of this phenomenon), which shedding light on the Great Terror and seeking the causes of this phenomenon, try to give the answer to the question why this happened. In addition to this, 'when studying the mechanisms of repression 1936 – 1938 years certain contradictions were found'². First of all, they relate to the question of how and where the very idea of the Great Terror came from, it's institutional basis, as it developed, spontaneously or under the control of Stalin, and finally, where was the boundary between terror and other forms of violence, inherent in Stalin's management system. The most complex repression issue can be studied through the application of a multi-factor analysis. The great terror, as in the whole Stalinist system, can't be explained by putting one or another component in the foreground. Both internal and external causes and factors influenced the essence of Stalin's policy and governance. Focusing on social, political or personal factors, most of the theories, in the author's opinion, bypass the attention of the issue of the shell, in which repressions began and which, according to the author, was a total precession of simulacrum and *dissuasion*. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the Russian analogue of the concept of '*dissuasion*' – apotrophy, although it is as close as possible, but not the exact Greek term and does not fully reflect the essence of the concept of '*dissuasion*'. Therefore, the author of this work is inclined to use the very original notion used by the French philosopher J. Baudrillard – '*dissuasion*', which simultaneously combines such meanings as 'loss of beliefs, disbelief, rejection' and simultaneously 'intimidation, frightening', as well as 'deterrence, retention, and prevention'³.

The historiography of the Great Terror, repressions over the Poles in the USSR and the dissolution of the CPP, as one of the constituent elements of the problem, is huge. Western historians who addressed this issue (R. Conquest⁴, N. Werth⁵, A. Getty⁶, N. Naimark⁷, T. Martin⁸, B. Studer and B. Unfried⁹, etc.),

¹ Медушевский, А.Н. (2010). Сталинизм как модель социального конструирования. *Российская история*, 6, 3-29 <<http://www.rosspen.ru/files/ru/news/Medushevskii.pdf>> (2018, September, 14).

² Ibid.

³ Бодрийяр, Ж. (2015). *Симулякры и симуляции*. Москва: ПОСТУМ, 215.

⁴ Конквест, Р. (2009). *Великий терор. Сталінські чистки тридцятих років*. Луцьк: Терен, 880.

⁵ Верт, Н. (2010). *Террор и беспорядок. Сталинизм как система*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 447.

⁶ Getty, A. (2001). *Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939*. Yale: Yale University Press, 515.

⁷ Наймарк, Н. (2011). *Геноциди Сталіна*. Київ: Києво-Могилянська академія, 135.

⁸ Мартин, Т. (2013). *Імперія національного вирівнювання: нації та націоналізм в Радянському Союзі, 1923-1939*. Київ: Критика, 640.

⁹ Штудер, Б., Унфрід, Б. (2011). *Сталинские партийные кадры. Практика идентификации и дискурсы в Советском Союзе 1930-х гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 247.

Russian (V. Khaustov¹, A. Vatlin², F. Firsov³, M. Panteleiev⁴, L. Babičenko⁵, etc.), however their approaches and interpretations remain in the discussion field.

The core of the problem is presented by the collection of documents⁶, which cover relations within the ruling elite of the VKP(b) (between J. Stalin and his immediate circle) and between 'the master of the Kremlin' and state structures, including III International and his general secretary G. Dimitrov, who were also drawn into the blast of the Great Terror of 1936-1938 and documents from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI) on the dissolution of the CPP⁷. An important source is the Diary of G. Dimitrov, in which we find the information about both the terror itself and the role of J. Stalin in the repression, and the memories of M. Buber-Neumann, the wife of H. Neumann, one of the functionaries of the Comintern, who witnessed the repressions of 1936-1938 and was repressed herself. A certain difficulty in working out the sources related to the Great Terror and the 1930s generally is that the instructions of J. Stalin rarely had clearly expressed character and orientation, which affected the language of the documents themselves, in the final approval and review of which he personally often took the most active part and acted as the last instance.

During the period from September 1936 to November 1938, when the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) bodies headed by N. Yezhov, with whom the Great Terror was associated, there were unprecedented repressions that swept the entire population: from the leadership of the Political Bureau up to ordinary Soviet citizens. The Great Terror included more than a dozen operations, planned at the highest level, equal to J. Stalin and N. Yezhov. According to the French historian N. Werth, these operations were carried out against the "enemies" who were divided into two 'lines': the 'kulak line' (defined by operational order No. 00447 of July 30, 1937) and the 'national line' (included all foreign citizens of the countries that were considered hostile to the USSR and Soviet citizens who had any connection with the former)⁸. The main events to which the attention of Western observers was drawn were three indicative Moscow processes – the 'case of 16', 1936, 'the case of 17', 1937, and 'the case of the 21', 1938. During these processes, the most prominent comrades of V. Lenin (G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, N. Krestinsky, A. Rykov, G. Pyatakov, K. Radek, N. Bukharin, etc.) confessed in their crimes: the organization of the terrorist centers aimed at the overthrow of Soviet power, the murder of its leaders, the restoration of capitalism, the commission of acts of harm, the destruction of the military power of the USSR, the division of the USSR between foreign states and separation from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, the Soviet Far East. This scene is a remarkable precession of the enemy and an 'operation for the *dissuasion* of any real process with its operational copy, an ideally descriptive, metastable, programmable mechanism that provides all the signs of the real, bypassing any peripetium'⁹ was necessary in order to hide the other – mass repressions of people of any social category.

¹ Хаустов, В. (1997). Из предыстории массовых репрессий против поляков. Середина 1930-х годов. *Исторические сборники Мемориал, Репрессии против поляков и польских граждан*. <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcy/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14).

² Vatlin, A. (1998). Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der Komintern. *Terror. Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen. 1936-1953*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 33-119.

³ Firsov, F. (1993). Die Säuberungen im Apparat der Komintern. *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten. Stalinistischer Terror und „Säuberungen“ in der kommunistischen Parteien Europas seit den dreißiger Jahren*. Berlin. Akademie Verlag, 37-51.

⁴ Panteleyev, M. (1994/1995). La Terreur stalinienne am Komintern en 1937-1938: Les chiffres et les causes. *Communisme*. 40/41. Paris, 37-53.

⁵ Babičenko, L. (1994/1995). Die Moskvin-Kommission. Neue Einseitigkeiten zur politisch-organisatorischen Struktur der Komintern in der Repressionsphase. *The International Newsletter of the Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism* 5/6. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 35-40.

⁶ Адибеков, Г., Андерсон, К., Шириня, К. (ред.) (2004). *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б) – ВКП(б) и Коминтерн: 1919 – 1943 гг. Документы*. Москва: РОССПЭН; Дэвис, Р.В., Хлевнюк, О.В., Рис, Е.А. (ред.). (2001). *Сталин и Каганович. Переписка. 1931-1936 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН; Яковлев, А. (ред.). (2004). *Лубянка. Сталин и Главное управление госбезопасности НКВД. Архив Сталина. Документы высших органов партийной и государственной власти. 1937-1938*. Москва: МФД.

⁷ Российский государственный архив социальной и политической истории (next – РГАСПИ). Ф. 505, Оп. 1, Д. 74, л. 1-6.

⁸ Верт, Н. (2010). *Террор и беспорядок. Сталинизм как система*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 237.

⁹ Бодрийяр, Ж. (2015). *Симулякры и симуляции*. Москва: ПОСТУМ, 7.

The remarkable illustration is the recording of the words of J. Stalin in the diary of G. Dimitrov of November 7, 1937: 'Therefore, whoever attempts to destroy that unity of the socialist state, whoever seeks the separation of any of its parts or nationalities—that man is an enemy, a sworn enemy of the state and of the peoples of the USSR. And we will destroy each and every such enemy, even if he was an old Bolshevik; we will destroy all his kin, his family. We will mercilessly destroy anyone who, by his deeds or his thoughts—yes, his thoughts—threatens the unity of the socialist state'¹. Subsequently, during the Great Terror, precession and *dissuasion* will expand to the borders of the entire Soviet Union. Inconspicuous for the foreign observers, this process will affect the consciousness of Soviet citizens of all sections of society, squeezing the party-state to the size of the state party. 1936-1938 will be the last act in a political struggle that will deprive J. Stalin of his main rivals.

One of the main tools that provided the material on the basis of which the NKVD carried out repressions was 'purge'. The purge and demonstration process in the specified period turned out to be like two other components of the totalitarian triad of control, the phenomena of criticism and self-critique and biography and autobiography, on one of the elements of terror, in a way, on its information basis. 'Purge is an expression of party self-criticism, it is its highest form'². In contrast to L. Kaganovich (during the research period, the People's Commissar of Communications), M. Buber-Neumann in his memoirs suggests defining purges, according to the author, as close as possible to the understanding of the party's ordinary member: 'This was supposed to be a protective mechanism against 'fraudsters, bureaucrats, dishonest, unstable Communists and Mensheviks'. Purges <...> became a method that kept in fear of all party members. In 1936, the cleansing carried out, to a certain extent, preliminary work for the NKVD: the desired accusative material against the arrested was assembled earlier in the process of purge'³. Today the term 'purge' is most often used to refer to the Great Terror of 1936-1938. R. Conquest in the scientific circle introduced the concept of 'Great Terror', and since then it has been successful in world historiography. It is important to understand that the second half of the 1930s included not only purge. Purges only became part of the 'apocalyptic theater of horror,' according to a well-meaning statement by N. Naimark⁴, which embraced the USSR in the second half of the 1930s.

German historians B. Studer and B. Unfried attribute the origins of the 'great purge' of 1936-1938 directly to the murder of S. Kirov in 1934. If by that time 'purge' meant the periodic 'self-purification' of the party from all sorts of 'unworthy elements' during the campaign of verification (in the sense of L. Kaganovich and M. Buber-Neumann), then in 1936 it acquired a new property. From repressive discipline and intimidation of purge in the Great Terror process, it became extermination, a kind of slime of decimation. It is significant that the reasons for the exclusion became more and more 'political' – the connection with 'hostile elements', 'Trotskyism', 'victimization', and of course, 'espionage'⁵.

The decision of the VII Congress of the Comintern in 1935 to establish a united anti-fascist front was an implicit confirmation that the bet on the communist parties alone did not justify itself. Secretary, member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) and senior NKVD (since 1935) M. Moskvina (M. Trilisser) admitted that neither numerous machines of communist parties nor funding through the ECCI major measures didn't bring the desired results: in many European countries hadn't been created mass communist parties, but for the existing ones, as M. Moskvina characterized as rachitic, having 'a big head on the thin, like matches, legs'⁶.

At the same time, up to the middle of the 1930s there was a significant strengthening of the regime of residence on the territory of the USSR for the representatives of the fraternal Communist Parties. Many of the communists who worked in the Comintern were at that time considered as a recruiting base for foreign intelligence. During the first half of the 1930s, conditions were created in order to quickly expand

¹ Dimitrov, G. (2003). *The Diary. 1933-1949*. Yale: Yale University Press, 65.

² Каганович, Л.М. (1933). *О чистке партии*. Москва, Ленинград: Партиздат. <<https://stalinism.ru/dokumenty/i/o-chistke-partii-postanovlenie-tsk-i-tskk-vkpb.html>> (2018, September, 14).

³ Бубер-Нейман, М. (1995). *Мировая революция и сталинский режим: записки очевидца о деятельности Коминтерна в 1920-1930-х годах*. Москва: АИРО-XX, 231-232.

⁴ Наймарк, Н. (2011). *Геноциди Сталіна*. Київ: Видавничий дім «Києво-Могилянська академія», 85.

⁵ Штудер, Б., Унфريد, Б. (2011). *Сталинские партийные кадры. Практика идентификации и дискурсы в Советском Союзе 1930-х гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 78-79.

⁶ Хаустов, В., Самуэльсон, Л. (2010). *Сталин, НКВД и репрессии 1936-1938 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 185.

mass operations in the communist circles in the event of a change in the course of punitive politics¹. Finally, the place and participation of the Comintern was resolved shortly before the start of the Great Terror, at the December plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) in 1935. The decisions of the plenum on checking party documents were criticized for its negligent and focused on the overall performance indicators in the field of the Comintern, resulting in the party succeeded in penetrating 'open enemies, including even spies of foreign intelligence'. 'They penetrated under the guise of political immigrants and members of the fraternal communist parties.' In this direction, a number of resolutions were directed to strengthen the control of members of the foreign party, designed to expose the enemy². With this decision, the Comintern was drawn into a circle of continuous inspections that were approaching the culmination of the Great Terror.

In January 1936 a commission was formed, headed by M. Moskvin (M. Trilisser). It started the examination of all personal cases of employees of the Comintern. In addition, an attempt was made to cover the political migrants who did not work in the Comintern, including those who lived on the rimland³. The result of M. Moskvin's policy was the 'elimination of the personnel', as well as after his death, along with the 'team' of N. Yezhov (November 1938), his opponents in the personnel department⁴.

In the purges of the new type, from the outset, the accusation and result were recorded. As noted by B. Unfried, setting goals and activities of numerous commissions created in the years 1936-1937 for the purge of the Comintern and the emigrant environment was quite simple: change of the personnel of the Comintern and destruction of old frames⁵. One of the secretaries of the Comintern, D. Manuilsky defined one of the objectives of creating defense system as 'which will lead to self-agent class enemy'⁶. The decisive difference between purges and terror of 1936-1938 was that the logic of the latter remained hidden from potential victims, especially from foreigners. The goal was to eliminate the emigrant environment, and purge then meant the maximum expulsion of foreigners, which also began to count the frames of the fraternal Communist parties. However, it couldn't be declared openly, without the consent of the official ideology. Such actions were coded, as indicated by B. Unfried in a given stereotype representations, mainly in the form of enemy associated with abroad⁷. In the time of the terror of 1936-1938, foreigners were a desirable goal. As 'foreigners', people fall into the cauldron of repression and terror in which they were pointed as a political factor, were useful as human material destruction system⁸.

The 1937 became extremely difficult for the Comintern. All services rushed from the Secretaries to the Communist Party offices. Between January 1 and September 17, 1937, the Commission of the Secretariat of the ECCI, composed of M. Moskvin, V. Florin and J. Anvelt, followed by a special Verification Commission, was established in May 1937 in the composition of G. Dimitrov, M. Moskvin, and D. Manuilsky, decided to exclude 256 members⁹. During the first half of 1937, the staff of the Comintern was dismissed by one-sixth employees (102 out of 606 employees) with the following wording: 'Caught as an enemy of the party and people', 'As an enemy to the people,' etc.¹⁰. In the situation where

¹ Хаустов, В., Самуэльсон, Л. (2010). *Сталин, НКВД и репрессии 1936-1938 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 56.

² Vatlin, A. (1998). Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der Komintern. *Terror. Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen. 1936-1953*: 33-119. Paderborn: Schöningh, 66-69.

³ Babičenko, L. (1994/1995). Die Moskvin-Kommission. Neue Einzelheiten zur politisch-organisatorischen Struktur der Komintern in der Repressionsphase. *The International Newsletter of the Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism* 5/6. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 35-39.

⁴ Штудер, Б., Унфрид, Б. (2011). *Сталинские партийные кадры. Практика идентификации и дискурсы в Советском Союзе 1930-х гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 82.

⁵ Ibid, 80.

⁶ Babičenko, L. (1994/1995). Die Moskvin-Kommission. Neue Einzelheiten zur politisch-organisatorischen Struktur der Komintern in der Repressionsphase. *The International Newsletter of the Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism* 5/6. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 36.

⁷ Штудер, Б., Унфрид, Б. (2011). *Сталинские партийные кадры. Практика идентификации и дискурсы в Советском Союзе 1930-х гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 81.

⁸ Ochotin, N., Roginski, A. (2000/2001). Zur Geschichte der „Deutschen Operation“ des NKWD 1937-1938. *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 89-125.

⁹ Куртуа, С., Верт, Н., Панне, Ж.-Л., Пачковский, А., Бартошек, К., Марголен, Ж.-Л. (2001). *Чёрная книга коммунизма. Преступления, террор, репрессии*. Москва: Три века истории, 284.

¹⁰ Адибеков, Г.М., Шахназарова, Э.Н., Шириня, К.К. (1997). *Организационная структура Коминтерна. 1919-1943*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 191.

many conspicuous workers of the Comintern became victims of repression, the activity of the governing bodies of the ECCI decreased. An illustration may be the following fact: between the two meetings of the ECCI in 1938, four and a half months (August 16 and December 26, respectively) took place¹.

The repressions of the Communist people began with the arrests of the leaders of the Communist Party of Poland, including Y. Lensky (Leschinsky), the secretary-general of the Communist Party, and others. In general, the NKVD preferred those whose foreign Communist Party was driven underground and in their case could hardly be any "diplomatic complications"². The arrested heads of the Polish section of the CPP began to give testimony concerning the leadership of the ECCI. One of the first was arrested B. Melnikov, who led all the technical work to prepare employees for the Comintern various tasks abroad, including the provision of documents, special means, organization of radio communication, encryption cases. He led the Department of International Relations (DIR), and then the Communications Service (CS) of the Comintern, which would be 'most clogged'³. It was this service that sent couriers to the communist parties abroad, and organized contact points in various countries of the world. Subsequently, there were arrests of executives who were responsible for illegal channels of communication between the Comintern parties in different countries. As for O. Piatnitsky, head of administrative and political department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and V. Knorin, deputy head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) who worked in the Comintern until 1935, and others, they put forward accusations that they indicate V. Khaustov and L. Samuelson, set out to: disruption of the Comintern and the gradual seizure of the ECCI apparatus; the unification of Trotskyist and other opposition forces within the Communist Party in order to paralyze its work; organization of systematic actions against the policy and illegal activities of the ECCI and its parties in capitalist countries; carrying out anti-Soviet propaganda; removing and discrediting the individual Comintern leaders; the struggle for leadership in certain Communist parties, the withdrawal of these parties from the Comintern and their entry into the IV International⁴. The NKVD advanced version of their relation with the son of L. Trotsky L. Sedov, which occurred after W. Münzenberg, a member of the German Communist Party, who was in Paris. Between them there was an exchange of money received by W. Münzenberg from the ECCI and information on the situation of the international communist movement. Another 'vicious' act was the organization of resistance to the new leadership of the ECCI, headed by G. Dimitrov before and during the VII Congress of the Comintern. Performance of H. Pollit, British Secretary of the Communist Party in defense of O. Piatnitsky in VII Congress Presidium was regarded as schismatic actions of the Hungarian communist B. Kun, A. Abramov-Mirow, Assistant Chief of the 4th Red Army Management Staff and F. Mering. External factors that contributed to increased repression against the leaders of the Comintern, were the defeat of the communists in parliamentary elections in Germany and the rise of power of the National Socialists, led by A. Hitler.

An example of the case against W. Münzenberg, the representative of the Communist Party of Germany (German: *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD*) and one of its founders, as well as the creators of the policy of anti-fascism, is quite indicative in terms of eliminating political opponents during the described period. W. Münzenberg joined the socialist party early enough to leave after seeing V. Lenin in Zurich. An active anti-militarist, a member of the Spartacus organization. Soon, in 1919, V. Lenin invited W. Münzenberg to Moscow. Shortly thereafter he was among the representatives of a network of various societies that were engaged in propaganda of the Soviet experience. The main categories for which the advocacy of W. Münzenberg was aimed were intellectuals, artists and cultural elite. As M. Sperber wrote about him, 'he pushed writers, philosophers, artists of all kinds to certify their own signatures as belonging to the foremost ranks of the most radical fighters ... he thus had in place a whole set of intellectuals who only waited for his sign to hit the road with him; he chose the direction

¹ Адиебеков, Г.М., Шахназарова, Э.Н., Шириня, К.К. (1997). *Организационная структура Коминтерна. 1919-1943*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 193.

² Бубер-Нейман, М. (1995). *Мировая революция и сталинский режим: записки очевидца о деятельности Коминтерна в 1920-1930-х годах*. Москва: АИРО-XX, 250; Конквест, Р. (2009). *Великий терор. Сталінські чистки тридцятих років*. Луцьк: Терен, 672.

³ Адиебеков, Г., Андерсон, К., Шириня, К. (ред.) (2004). *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б) – ВКП(б) и Коминтерн: 1919 – 1943 гг. Документы*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 749.

⁴ Хаустов, В., Самуэльсон, Л. (2010). *Сталин, НКВД и репрессии 1936-1938 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 186.

of motion himself¹. French historian, researcher of communism, F. Furet characterizes W. Münzenberg during the anti-fascist turn, as a person who became something like ‘the world underground minister of propaganda of the Comintern, the influence of which was first of all felt in Western Europe’². W. Münzenberg was accustomed to living on the rimland of the communist movement and to draw attention by his charisma and the power of the campaigner of sympathizers outside the communist movement. This caused certain suspicions in Moscow.

By 1936, W. Münzenberg remained a faithful follower and supporter of J. Stalin and Soviet foreign policy, despite his conflict with the German communist W. Ulbricht on the further fate of the German *Volksfront*. The result of this conflict was the gradual distancing of W. Münzenberg from the Comintern and its transition to the opposition to the Stalinist regime in 1936. In October 1936 G. Dimitrov offered W. Münzenberg to head the propaganda department. But he refused. If he agreed to head the department, the ‘Münzenberg problem’ most likely would have been decided within the framework of the Great Terror, but he remained in Paris. W. Ulbricht, a member of the KPD in the exile, knew about the possible fate of W. Münzenberg, if he appeared in Moscow, about which later he confessed O. Klepper, a German lawyer and former Prussian minister of finance³. Another confirmation was in the diary of G. Dimitrov on November 11, 1937, we found a record of his conversation with J. Stalin, who calls W. Münzenberg a ‘trotskyist’ and suggests trying to lure him to Moscow to arrest⁴. March 21, 1938, W. Pieck, with the consent of the Kremlin, sends G. Dimitrov a draft resolution to exclude W. Münzenberg from the Central Committee of the KPD⁵. In 1939, he decides to leave the KPD, finally breaking with Stalin’s communism.

The beginning of mass repressions in the Comintern was connected with the arrests of former leaders of the International Relations Department, B. Melnikov, and after him A. Abramov-Mirov. The former members of the Communist Party of Hungary and Poland, L. Madyar and Havkin (Walter), was arrest before the spring of 1937 and testified to the existence of an anti-communist organization. After the acquaintance with the materials of interrogation in April 1937, L. Madyar, J. Stalin instructed N. Yezhov to arrest B. Melnikov and his ‘environment’, which was done. At the end of May, J. Stalin receives the confession of B. Melnikov, where he points out A. Abramov-Mirov as an accomplice to the ‘counter-revolutionary organization’. With the sanction of J. Stalin, on the proposal of N. Yezhov A. Abramov-Mirov was arrested.

According to researchers V. Khaustov and L. Samuelson, the testimonies of B. Melnikov and A. Abramov-Mirov led to the arrest of the leaders of the points of contact in Warsaw, Paris, Stockholm and Copenhagen. By early July 1937, more than 20 people were arrested. Then was arrested V. Knorin and O. Piatnitsky. According to the personal instructions of J. Stalin B. Kun was arrested. As a result of the work of investigators of the NKVD, a ‘counterrevolutionary Trotsky-right organization’ was formed in the ECCI, in which a number of leaders of the Comintern played a major role. O. Piatnitsky was appointed as leader⁶. New research, primarily the intelligence of the famous Russian historian F. Firsov, testifies that a full-scale destruction of the Comintern and, in general, political emigration in the USSR was planned in the immediate physical sense. The signal was to become the fourth major demonstration process – against the Comintern⁷.

¹ Sperber, M. (1990). *Les visages de l'histoire*. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 92 <https://books.google.nl/books?id=_XKjyjlt-2YC&pg=PA85&dq=Manès+Sperber+Munzenberg&hl=ru&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Man%C3%A8s%20Sperber%20Munzenberg&f=false> (2018, September, 14).

² Фюре, Ф. (2007). *Минуле однієї ілюзії: Нарис про комуністичну ідею у XX столітті*. Київ: ДУХ І ЛІТЕРА, 347.

³ Braskén, K. (2011). "Hauptgefahr jetzt nicht Troztkismus, sondern Münzenberg" – East German Uses of Remembrance and the Contentious Case of Willi Münzenberg. *CoWoPa – Comintern Working Papers* 22, 12 <<https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa22brasken.pdf>> (2018, September, 14).

⁴ Dimitrov, G. (2003). *The Diary. 1933-1949*. Yale: Yale University Press, 69.

⁵ Courtois, S. (1994). La seconde mort de Willi Munzenberg. *Communisme*. 38/39, 35 <https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=kNY7Qlpt4zAC&pg=PA187&dq=communisme+revue+1994+38&hl=ru&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false> (2018, September, 14).

⁶ Хаустов, В., Самуэльсон, Л. (2010). *Сталин, НКВД и репрессии 1936-1938 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН, 188.

⁷ Firsov, F. (1993). Die Säueberungen im Apparat der Komintern. *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten. Stalinistischer Terror und „Säueberungen“ in der kommunistischen Parteien Europas seit den dreißiger Jahren*. Berlin. Akademie Verlag, 37-51; Starkov, B. (1994). The Trial that was not Held. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, Ltd, 1297-1315.

The arrests didn't bypass other representatives of the Communist parties in the Comintern who lived at the 'Lux' Hotel. Already after the first trial, according to M. Buber-Neumann, some of those who lived at the 'Lux' Hotel found themselves an 'important job': 'they became agents of the State Political Directorate (GPU) and informed their compatriots'¹. Suspicion was spread among the apparatus of the Comintern and spyware was spread to Soviet society. Among the arrested communist leaders there were H. Neumann, G. Remmelle, F. Schultz, G. Schubert, L. Flig, G. Zuskind, V. Hirsch, G. Eberlein, all former members of the Politburo of the KPD. Besides B. Kun, all the People's Commissars (12 people) of the ephemeral communist government in Budapest were arrested and executed. There were about 200 Italian and 100 Yugoslav Communists arrested².

The terms separating the party's from the party arrest were varied: as noted by the authors of the Black Book of Communism, O. Walter was expelled from the Secretariat of G. Dimitrov, on October 16, 1938 she was arrested two days later, at that time As J. Borovsky (L. Komorowski) was expelled from the ECCI on July 17 and was arrested only on October 17, 1937. Some were arrested directly at the workplace, as A. Krajewski, responsible for the press and propaganda service. Many were arrested after their return from foreign missions. M. Moskvin was arrested on November 23, 1938 and executed on February 1, 1940, J. Anvelt died of torture. Fifty officials, including nine women, were shot³. According to M. Panteleïev, these purges had the specific purpose of eradicating any opposition to the Stalinist dictatorship⁴.

As for the Communist Party of Poland (CPP), the last was unofficially liquidated on November 28, 1937. Officially, the decision of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) and the Resolution of the Secretariat of the ECCI was held and approved by the Presidium of the ECCI only on August 16, 1938, Protocol No. 27 (B) and 337 (B) respectively⁵. These documents were adopted post factum, when the leaders and head of the Central Committee of the CPP were liquidated. This event was preceded by the gradual elimination of the ruling elite of the Central Committee of the CPP, without which the party would not be able to function properly. By the series of resolutions and punitive operations the NKVD by the consent of J. Stalin, was subjected to repression not only of the Polish Communists, but also of representatives of Polish nationality and political immigrants who lived on the territory of the USSR.

According to the Russian historian V. Rogovin, the reasons for the complete elimination of the PCP should be found in the first half of the 1920s, when its leadership supported the left opposition in the RKP(b)⁶. Since that time, J. Stalin felt certain distrust from the Poles. The first repressions of the Polish Communists began in the late 1920s, when the party split into the 'right' and 'left' fractions. The state of CPP in the late 1920s caused anxiety for the leadership of the VKP(b) and the Comintern, because they considered Poland as an important ally in the new imperialist war, and regarded the CPP as an extremely important party. In order to overcome the fractional split, in August 1928, V. Molotov who was currently engaged in the most important Comintern affairs at the request of J. Stalin, suggested his own plan for resolving the fractional struggle in the CPP and the formation of a new Central Committee⁷. The measures proposed by V. Molotov ultimately led to the transition of power to the 'left'. The intervention of the Comintern and Stalin in the affairs of the Polish Communist Party took place, but not as radical as we can read in the 1929 'Bulletins of the oppositionist', which states that 'the Comintern, with the help of the GPU,' ruled 'the dispute between the 'right' groupings of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (A. Warski, M. Koszutska (W. Kostrzewa), etc.) and 'left' (group of J. Leszczyński "Lenski"), sending the majority to the right of exile'⁸.

¹ Бубер-Нейман, М. (1995). *Мировая революция и сталинский режим: записки очевидца о деятельности Коминтерна в 1920-1930-х годах*. Москва: АИРО-XX, 249.

² Куртуа, С., Верт, Н., Панне, Ж.-Л., Пачковский, А., Бартошек, К., Марголен, Ж.-Л. (2001). *Чёрная книга коммунизма. Преступления, террор, репрессии*. Москва: Три века истории, 198.

³ Ibid, 284.

⁴ Panteleyev, M. (1994/1995). La Terreur stalinienne am Komintern en 1937-1938: Les chiffres et les causes. *Communisme*, 40/41, 48.

⁵ РГАСПИ Ф. 505, Оп. 1, Д. 74, Л. 1-4, 5-6.

⁶ Роговин, В.З. (1997). *Партия расстрелянных*. Москва: Московская типография №3 РАН. <<https://stuff.mit.edu/people/fjk/Rogovin/volume5/index.html>> (2018, September, 14).

⁷ Адибеков, Г., Андерсон, К., Шириня, К. (ред.) (2004). *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б) – ВКП(б) и Коминтерн: 1919 – 1943 гг. Документы*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 543-545.

⁸ *Бюллетень оппозиции*, 66-67 (май-июнь 1938 г.). <<https://web.mit.edu/fjk/FI/BO/BO-66.shtml>> (2018, September, 14).

At the same time the repressions against activists of the Communist Parties of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus began. Announcing the agents of J. Pilsudski being of Polish 'rights', a large amounts of arrests in 1933 took place. In 1933-1934, several members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and communist deputies of the Polish Sejm were shot. After that, J. Lenski's group declared the 'destruction of provocateurs' and 'purification of the atmosphere' in the checkpoint. After this, the Kremlin only defined the policy of the Polish Communists, who initially took the position of ultra-right, then dramatically changed it to the tactics of the 'people's front'.

The new stage of repression, this time against ethnic minorities in the USSR, including the Polish minority living in the border areas of the Belorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR, begins in the mid-1930s, almost immediately after the 'tampering' of the checkpoint. This was due to the fact that the rise of fascist and authoritarian regimes in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland ('sanation' regime of J. Pilsudski), as well as the convergence on the international scene of Germany with Poland, forced the Soviet Union to change the functioning regime of the border areas. From now on, official Soviet propaganda, using the phrase from the letter L. Kaganovich J. Stanin of August 11¹ emphasized the transformation not only of the USSR, but of the entire Soviet Union into a 'fortpost' in the face of foreign influences. Repressions on the basis of nationality were explained by the fact that an American historian T. Martin said that border ethnic minorities, including Poles, 'had transboundary ethnic ties with another national state'². A possible pretext was the German-made campaign in 1933-1934 to help German 'brothers in trouble' – victims of famine in the USSR. This campaign demonstrated the ability of foreign governments to use national minorities as weapons against the Soviet Union. Later, with the same request to the Polish consul in Kiev, the Poles addressed. This, as well as the concern of the head of the Belarussian government, N. Goloded on the situation in the border areas, where 'the possibility of <...> training of Polish fascism of its plot for the future' was a real reason for the beginning of ethnic cleansing and the gradual elimination of the national institutions of the Poles that have now been considered 'unreliable'. One remarkable fact was that ethnic purge involved not only border areas, but also spread inside the country, covering the entire territory of the USSR. Repressions against ethnic Poles who occupied various positions in the party and Soviet apparatus, the NKVD and the Red Army organs began at the end of 1936 – early 1937³. In 1936, the Party Control Commission and the NKVD began purging among political emigrants, focusing on the Poles. According to Russian historian V. Khaustov⁴, this purge has quickly turned into a campaign of mass arrests. With the onset of the 'massive operations' of the Great Terror in the summer of 1937, the terror against the elite – the foreign communists – merged with the ethnic terror that was directed against its own citizens of diaspora nationalities, which resulted in a mass campaign of terror against a new category of hostile nationalities. Part of the arrests of the PCP representatives was the result of a campaign to eliminate the long time ago existing Polish military organization (PMO). This is evident by the fact that August 11, 1937 the Politburo approved an operational Commissar order №00485 'On repression operation against members of the PMO Polish army defectors from Poland and political emigrants from Poland, former members of Polish political parties'⁵. The order was signed on August 13 by N. Yezhov, the definition of who should be arrested – all political immigrants and fugitives, 'the most active part of the local nationalist elements of the Polish national areas'⁶. In October 1937 this category was expanded to include all Poles with 'consular ties' (almost all Poles in the USSR)⁷. In 1938, the NKVD arrested

¹ Дэвис, Р.В., Хлевнюк, О.В., Рис, Е.А. (ред.). (2001). *Сталин и Каганович. Переписка. 1931-1936 гг.* Москва: РОССПЭН. 274.

² Мартин, Т. (2013). *Імперія національного вирівнювання: нації та націоналізм в Радянському Союзі, 1923-1939.* Київ: Критика. 426-427.

³ Куртуа, С., Верт, Н., Панне, Ж.-Л., Пачковский, А., Бартошек, К., Марголен, Ж.-Л. (2001). *Чёрная книга коммунизма. Преступления, террор, репрессии.* Москва: Три века истории, 186.

⁴ Хаустов, В. (1997). Из предьстории массовых репрессий против поляков. Середина 1930-х годов.

Исторические сборники Мемориал, Репрессии против поляков и польских граждан.

<<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcu/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14).

⁵ Яковлев, А. (ред.) (2004). *Лубянка. Сталин и Главное управление госбезопасности НКВД. Архив Сталина. Документы высших органов партийной и государственной власти. 1937–1938.* Москва: МФД. 301-303.

⁶ Шаповал, Ю., Пристайко, В., Золотарьов, В. (1997) *ЧК-ГПУ-НКВД в Україні: особи, факти, документи.* Київ: Абрис, 348.

⁷ Петров, Н.В., Рогинский, А.Б. (1997). Польская операция НКВД 1937-1938 гг. *Исторические сборники Мемориал, Репрессии против поляков и польских граждан.* <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcu/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14).

the Poles, as well as representatives of other nationalities, notably on the basis of nationality¹. Resolution of the Politburo of 15 January 1938 was extended until April 15, 1938 ‘operation to defeat espionage and sabotage troops among Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Harbin, Chinese and Romanian as foreign nationals and Soviet citizens, in accordance with the existing orders of the NKVD of the USSR’. People were arrested on the ‘Polish line’ or the ‘German line’ of national terror². Number of executed prisoners and minorities, unfortunately, is not known for sure, because no one was arrested as part of the Polish operation was a Pole, as not all Poles were arrested for ‘Polish Line’. All national institutions on the territory of the USSR were declared ‘artificially created’, in other words – historically unjustified. Moreover, as noted by T. Martin based on the processed documents one of the delegates at the October plenum (1937) said: ‘The Poles, working through its agents, national fascists and ‘trotskyist’ Spies strengthened border areas of his people’³. Thus, the party formulated an undisclosed publicly explanation of national terror as part of the Great Terror. N. Petrov and A. Roginsky estimated that in the ‘Polish operation’ were arrested 139,835 people, while the total number of all Poles arrested in all national operations conducted under №00447 counted 118 000 – 123 000 people for the entire period of Great Terror⁴.

In 1937 almost all Polish Communists who were in the USSR were arrested. Some of them occupied positions in the structures and divisions of the Third International, which created the need to exclude them and condemn them. The document of the session of the International Control Commission (ICC) of November 22, 1937, is rather characteristic. The Polish Communists, who were part of the ICC (F. Grzegorzewski, A. Krajewski and G. Wałeccki) were expelled from their own Communist parties as enemies of the people and arrested by Soviet authorities. The session of the ICC decided to exclude from its members arrested by the Soviet authorities and expelled from his party Polish comrades as enemies of the people. This logic is quite simple – you are branded as ‘enemy of the people’, excluded from the party and the NKVD takes you. Evidence would appear as soon as they needed it. The sentence followed the investigation. Pure procession of simulacrum. According to American historian A. Getty, this document ‘symbolizes the fate of many Poles who lived on the territory of the USSR’⁵. In February 1938, the official newspaper of the Comintern “La Correspondance Internationale” published twice a week, published the accusal for entire checkpoint, signed by J. Svisiski. In the period of ‘purge’, which began in June 1937, the twelve members of the Communist Party the ruling leadership of the USSR, including its general secretary J. Lenski and 70-year old A. Warski, one of the founders of the Social-Democratic and Communist Polish party, as well as all the Polish representatives who occupied positions in the higher authorities of the Third International. The Poles, who were in international brigades: political leaders of the brigade of Dombrovsky, K. Chikhovski and G. Reicher were detained immediately after returning from Spain to Moscow⁶.

Analyzing the documents concerning the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland, the establishment of the initiative group had to be temporarily engaged in Polish affairs and the letter from G. Dimitrov to J. Stalin on November 28, 1937 became clear logic of events and the role played by the ‘great medium’, and J. Stalin, in these events.

The resolution of the ECCI can be clearly divided into several parts. The first part, or preamble, denouncing Polish fascism that made ‘espionage, sabotage and provocation an important weapon in their struggle against the labor movement, against all anti-fascist, democratic forces poisoned by this shameful system of all political and social life of Poland’ defines its main purpose ‘to infiltrate the communist movement, which represents the greatest threat to Polish fascism’. By combining into one unit the members

¹ Білоконь, С. (1993). Документи з історії НКВД УРСР: Публікація 45 документів. *Наше минуле: Журнал незалежної історичної думки*, 1 (6), 40-41.

² Петров, Н.В., Рогинский, А.Б. (1997). Польская операция НКВД 1937-1938 гг. *Исторические сборники Мемориал, Репрессии против поляков и польских граждан*. <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcu/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14).

³ Мартин, Т. (2013). *Імперія національного вирівнювання: нації та націоналізм в Радянському Союзі, 1923-1939*. Київ: Критика, 441.

⁴ Петров, Н.В., Рогинский, А.Б. (1997). Польская операция НКВД 1937-1938 гг. *Исторические сборники «Мемориал», «Репрессии против поляков и польских граждан»*. <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcu/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14).

⁵ Getty, A. (2001). *Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939*. Yale: Yale University Press, 286.

⁶ Куртуа, С., Верт, Н., Панне, Ж.-Л., Пачковский, А., Бартошек, К., Марголен, Ж.-Л. (2001). *Чёрная книга коммунизма. Преступления, террор, репрессии*. Москва: Три века истории, 289.

of anti-fascist and democratic forces opposing them and fascism, preamble, thus forming a single image, but an abstract enemy who is hiding under the definition of 'Polish fascism.'

The second part of the document, or allegations, begins with the fact that the 'Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the basis of incontrovertible documentary data', which the Bureau of the ECCI did not call, revealed that in the CPP during the years 'enemies who worked as the agents of Polish fascism', which were sent to the CPP under the guise of 'opposition elements that passed into the ranks of the communist movement', 'promoted their agents to leadership positions in the Communist Party', moreover, more than once 'exposing their agents to the prison, staging comedy at their trial'. At the same time, 'Polish fascism widely used the Trotskyist-Bukharin freaks' and 'stirred up the fractional struggle in the party'. The accusation ends with the fact that 'all attempts to expel the agents of Polish fascism <...> while maintaining the present organization <...> proved to be unsuccessful'. The precession of the enemy follows the direction of the general idea – 'Polish Fascism' – to a specific one – the listing of all those who hid under the mask of 'Polish fascism' and worked for the enemy against anti-fascist and democratic forces. The document on the dissolution of the CPP is an example of one of many operations for the real *dissuasion* that was conducted throughout the entire period of the Great Terror and after it.

Since the CPP turned out to be an 'incurable patient', the Presidium of the ECCI was left with no choice but to dissolve the CPP recommendations 'all honest Communists to restore the CPP to move the focus of its work on mass organizations, which are working and fighting for the unity of the anti-fascist forces and movements of the national front in Poland'¹. As A. Getty pointed², the decision to dissolve the CPP, approved by the ECCI on November 28, 1937, was adopted five days earlier, November 23, G. Dimitrov, D. Manuilsky, O. Kuusinen, M. Moskvin, and W. Pieck. November 28, G. Dimitrov sent a letter to J. Stalin with text resolution. In the letter G. Dimitrov also asked for advice and guidance on the following questions: whether it is necessary to address the issue of the dissolution of the CPP as long as the investigation is conducted or whether it is necessary to wait and in relation to the character of the contents of the decree on the dissolution of the CPP³. On the letter of G. Dimitrov, J. Stalin made an indicative note: 'The dissolution was late for two years. It should be dissolved, but shouldn't be published in the press, in my opinion'⁴.

In the end, creating an irreferent field where the sign value of the real-world objects were vague or non-existent, due to precession and real *dissuasion* there was created a system with a necessary mode of reality and there was also created and distributed the party and the field action. In other words, the expansion and deepening of terror during the years 1936-1938 helped to form the required space for the existing regime for the necessary action, according to Stalin and his surrounding, repressive measures have strengthened solidarity and defense of the USSR and the threat of a new world war. Enhanced with constant suspicion of the "Great Leader", the repression against political opponents of the VKP(b) developed into a total terror against its own people and ethnic minorities living in border regions, particularly against the Polish minority. Covering all the structures the terror could not but spread to the Third International, whose representatives, because of their foreign origin and family ties with nation-states have become preferred victims of repression. Purge and repression overtook the entire apparatus of the Comintern, causing much harm to communication services, which has been completely rebuilt and reorganized and the secretariats of the ECCI. 1/6 of the apparatus of the Comintern was subjected to 'purge'. However, the indicative process that was being prepared, as the Russian historian suggests, prof. F. Firsov, against the Third International, did not take place. Further research and discovery of new documents concerning repression of the Comintern, will clarify the assumptions of prof. F. Firsov.

Speaking about national sections, the Communist Party of Poland, which was secretly liquidated in November 1937, suffered the most, and all members of the Central Committee and Poles-functionaries of the Comintern and its subdivisions were repressed. Officially, the liquidation of the checkpoint became known only a few months later, in August 1938. Elimination of the CPP and repressions against Poles in the USSR took over 100,000 lives.

¹ РГАСПИ, Ф. 505, Оп. 1, Д. 74, Л. 1-4.

² Getty, A. (2001). *Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939*. Yale: Yale University Press. 286.

³ Адибеков, Г., Андерсон, К., Шириня, К. (ред.) (2004). *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б) – ВКП(б) и Коминтерн: 1919 – 1943 гг. Документы*. Москва: РОССПЭН, 758.

⁴ Ibid, 760.

References:

1. Adibekov, G., Anderson, K., Shirinya, K. (Eds.). (2004). *Politbjuro CK RKP(b) – VKP(b) i Komintern: 1919 – 1943 gg. Dokumenty*. [Politburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) – VKP(b) and the Comintern: 1919-1943. Documents]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
2. Adibekov, G., Shakhnazarova, E., Shirinya, K. (1997). *Organizacionnaja struktura Komintern. 1919-1943* [The organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919-1943]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
3. Babičenko, L. (1994/1995). Die Moskvin-Kommission. Neue Einzelheiten zur politisch-organisatorischen Struktur der Komintern in der Repressionsphase. [The Moskvin Commission. New details of the political-organizational structure of the Comintern in the period of repression.]. *The International Newsletter of the Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, 5/6, 35-40. [in German].
4. Baudrillard, J. (2015). *Simuljakry i simuljacii*. [Simulacrum and Simulation]. Moscow: POSTUM. [in Russian].
5. Bilokin, S. (1993). Dokumenty z istoriyi NKVD URSR: Publikaciya 45 dokumentiv. [Documents on the history of the NKVD of the USSR: Publication of 45 documents]. *Nashe mynule: Zhurnal nezalezhnoyi istorychnoyi dumky* [Our past: Journal of Independent Historical Thought], 1 (6), 39-150. [in Ukrainian].
6. Braskén, K. (2011). "Hauptgefahr jetzt nicht Trotzismus, sondern Münzenberg" – East German Uses of Remembrance and the Contentious Case of Willi Münzenberg. ["Main danger now not Trotskyism, but Munzenberg" – East German Uses of Remembrance and the Contentious Case of Willi Miinzenberg]. *CoWoPa – Comintern Working Papers*, 22, 1-30. <<https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa22brasken.pdf>> (2018, September, 14). [in English].
7. Buber-Neumann, M. (1995). *Mirovaja revoljucija i stalinskij rezhim: zapiski ochevidca o dejatel'nosti Komintern. v 1920-1930-h godah*. [The World Revolution and the Stalinist Regime: notes of an eyewitness about the activity of the Comintern in the 1920-1930s.] Moscow: AIRO-XX. [in Russian].
8. *Bjulleten oppozicii №66-67(maj-ijun' 1938 g.)* (1938) [Bulletin of the opposition No. 66-67 (May-June 1938)]. <<https://web.mit.edu/fjk/FI/BO/BO-66.shtml>> (2018, September, 14). [in Russian].
9. Conquest, R. (2009). *Velykyj teror. Stalinski chystky trydcyatyh rokov*. [The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties]. Lutsk: Teren. [in Ukrainian].
10. Courtois, S. (1994). La seconde mort de Willi Munzenberg. [The Second Death of Willi Munzenberg] *Communisme*. [Communism], 38/39, 25-41. <https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=kNY7Qlpt4zAC&pg=PA187&dq=communisme+revue+1994+38&hl=ru&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false> (2018, September, 14). [in French].
11. Courtois, S., Werth, N., Panne, J.-L., Paczkowski, A., Bartosek, K., Margolin, G.-L. (2001). *Chjornaja kniga kommunizma. Prestuplenija, terror, repressii*. [The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, terror, repressions]. Moscow: Tri veka istorii. [in Russian].
12. Davies, R.W., Khlevniuk, O.V., Rees, E.A. (Eds.) (2001). *Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg.* [The Stalin-Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
13. Dimitrov, G. (2003). *The Diary. 1933-1949*. Yale: Yale University Press. [in English].
14. Firsow, F. (1993). Die Säuberungen im Apparat der Komintern. [The purge in the apparatus of the Comintern] *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten. Stalinistischer Terror und „Säuberungen“ in der kommunistischen Parteien Europas seit den dreißiger Jahren*. [Communists persecute communists. Stalinist terror and "purge" in the communist parties of Europe since the thirties.], 37-51.
15. Furet, F. (2007). *Mynule odniyeyi ilyuziyi: Narys pro komunistychnu ideyu u XX stolitti*. [The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century]. Kyiv: DUHK I LITERA. [in Ukrainian].
16. Getty, A. (2001). *Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939*. Yale: Yale University Press. [in English].
17. Kaganovich, L. (1933). *O chistke partii*. [About purge the party]. Moscow, Leningrad: Partizdat <<https://stalinism.ru/dokumenty/i/o-chistke-partii-postanovlenie-tsk-i-tskk-vkpb.html>> (2018, September, 14). [in Russian].
18. Khaustov, V. (1997). Iz predystorii massovyh repressij protiv poljakov. Seredina 1930-h godov. [From the prehistory of mass repression against the Poles. The mid-1930s]. *Istoricheskie sborniki Memorial, Repressii protiv poljakov i polskih grazhdan* [Historical collections Memorial, Repression against Poles and Polish citizens]. <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcY/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14). [in Russian]
19. Khaustov, V., Samuelson, L. (2010). *Stalin, NKVD i repressii 1936-1938 gg.* [Stalin, NKVD and repressions 1936-1938]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
20. Martin, T. (2013). *Imperiya nacionalnoho vyrivnyuvannya: nacyi ta nacionalizm v Radyanskomu Soyuzi, 1923-1939*. [The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939]. Kyiv: Krytyka. [in Ukrainian].
21. Medushevsky, A. (2010). Stalinizm kak model' social'nogo konstruirovaniya. [Stalinism as a model of social construction]. *Rossijskaja istorija* [Russian History], 6, 3-29. <<http://www.rosspen.ru/files/ru/news/Medushevskii.pdf>> [in Russian].
22. Naimark, N. (2011). *Henocydy Stalina*. [Stalin's Genocides]. Kyiv: Publishing House Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. [in Ukrainian].

23. Ochotin, N., Roginski, A. (2000/2001). Zur Geschichte der „Deutschen Operation“ des NKWD 1937-1938. [On the history of the "German Operation" of the NKVD 1937-1938.] *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* [Yearbook of Historical Communism Research], 89-125. [in German].
24. Panteleyev, M. (1994/1995). La Terreur stalinienne am Komintern en 1937-1938: Les chiffres et les causes. [The Stalin Terror in the Comintern in 1937-1938: Figures and causes]. *Communisme*. [Communism], 40/41, 37-53. [in French].
25. Petrov, N., Roginsky, A. (1997). Polskaja operacija NKVD 1937-1938 gg. [Polish operation of the NKVD in 1937-1938]. *Istoricheskie sborniki Memorial, Repressii protiv poljakov i polskih grazhdan* [Historical collections Memorial, Repression against Poles and Polish citizens]. <<http://old.memo.ru/history/POLAcy/Index.htm>> (2018, September, 14). [in Russian].
26. Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arhiv social'no-politicheskoi istorii [Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History] Moscow. *Found 505, inventory 1, storage, unit 74, folio 1-4, 5-6*. [in Russian].
27. Rogovin, V. (1997). *Partija rasstreljannyh*. [Party of the executed]. Moscow: Moscow printing house No.3 RAN. <<https://stuff.mit.edu/people/fjk/Rogovin/volume5/index.html>> (2018, September, 14). [in Russian].
28. Shapoval, Y., Prystaiko, V., Zolotariov, V. (1997). *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukrayini: osoby, fakty, dokumenty*. [Cheka-GPU-NKBD in Ukraine: Persons, facts, documents]. Kyiv: Abrys. [in Ukrainian].
29. Sperber, M. (1990). *Les visages de l'histoire*. [The Faces of History] Paris: Editions Odile Jacob. <https://books.google.nl/books?id=_XKjyjlt-2YC&pg=PA85&dq=Manès+Sperber+Munzenberg&hl=ru&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Man%C3%A8s%20Sperber%20Munzenberg&f=false> (2018, September, 14). [in French].
30. Starkov, B. (1994). The Trial that was not Held. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46, 1297-1315 [in English].
31. Studer, B., Unfried, B. (2011). *Stalinskie partijnye kadry. Praktika identifikacii i diskursy v Sovetskom Sojuze 1930-h gg.* [Stalin's party cadres. The practice of identification and discourses in the Soviet Union of the 1930s]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
32. Vatlin, A. (1998). Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der Komintern. [Cadre politics and purges in the Comintern.] *Terror. Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen. 1936-1953* [Terror. Stalinist party purges. 1936-1953], 33-119. [in German].
33. Werth, N. (2010). *Terror i besporjadok. Stalinizm kak sistema*. [Terror and disorder. Stalinism as a system]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. [in Russian].
34. Yakovlev, A. (Ed.) (2004). *Lubjanka. Stalin i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti NKVD. Arhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshih organov partijnoj i gosudarstvennoj vlasti. 1937-1938*. [Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Department of State Security of the NKVD. Archive of Stalin. Documents of the highest organs of party and state power. 1937-1938]. Moscow: MFD. [in Russian].