Iryna Bershadska

H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

RATIONAL COGNITION OF THE UNKNOWABLE IN AL-GHAZALI'S PHILOSOPHY

This article is devoted to the consideration of the rational cognition of the unknowable, transcendent realms, veiled from a person in the philosophical heritage of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. Considerable attention is paid to the characteristic features of thinker's philosophic manner, among which ones can distinguish antiauthorarism, disapproval of doctrine, and skepticism. The application of a rational method to the cognition of the transcendent, to the God in al-Ghazali's philosophy is expressed through the understanding of the allusions sent by Allah, the concentration on independent and critical knowledge of the world, the cognition of human nature and the expansion of ours cognitive capabilities.

Keywords: hidden, allusion, cognition, perception, proposition, concept of two worlds.

The creative heritage of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali is so diverse that it is difficult to enlist this thinker only to one of the philosophical directions of the Arab-Muslim thought. During centuries, his figure remains mysterious for researchers of different times and people. In order to better understand the motives and sources of his philosophical works, it is worth to mention time and society when thinker created a distinctive feature of his philosophical searches.

Scientists, who study al-Ghazali's biography and works, suggest various reasons for the transformation of his views, in particular, why he comes to Sufism as a way of life in his arguments. However, we are interested not so much in the causes as the signs and features of his philosophical manner.

The independence in searches of truth, the necessity of the credibility of knowledge have acquired the most severe form in rejection of authoritarianism, doctrine and fanaticism[1]. Anti-authoritarianism is the main instrument of al-Ghazali's creative originality. Given the fact that in al-Ghazali's works there are no representative's names of different schools and teachings, we can say that such 'ignoring' expresses his desire to move away from imitation to the full independence of thought. He tried to find a criterion of truth outside the socio-historical condition of being, without depriving it of the status as the necessary source of knowledge. He set his assignment of revising the traditional values and dogmatised concepts developed in the discussions of various schools and sects. In his work "The Deliverance from Error", he states that the condition of commitment to authority is that person does not know that he is a follower of this[2]. Al-Ghazali considered authoritarianism of fiqh in the strict attachment to the mazhabs, the authoritarianism of the kalam – in his ideological obscurity, the authoritarianism of the Ismaili esoterism – in the full recognition of the 'sinless imam', authoritarianism of philosophy – in the removal and arrogance of logic about questions of metaphysics and authoritarianism of Sufism – in the absence of theoretical competence. This characteristic is not connected with thinker's transition to Sufism, but with the awareness of the crisis of theology. In this regard, his reflections can be seen in the work "Moderation in Belief", where al-Ghazali states the fact mutakallim's blind follow-up authorities. However, he compares the relation of Muslim philosophers with regard to the achievements of ancient Greek philosophy and the relation mutakallims to the kalam. He saw the weakness of Muslim philosophers in the uncritical relation toward the achievements of the Antiquity, the taking on trust fundament and accuracy of its sciences. Philosophers obeyed the authority of the names Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., admiration of the accuracy of logical evidence created an illusion of the absoluteness of all their knowledge. An important

---

[1] Аль-Джанаби, М.М. (2010). *Теология и философия ал-Газали*. Москва: Марджани, 42.

[2] Аль-Газали (2010). Избавляющий от заблуждения. Из *Средневековая арабо-мусульманская философия в переводах А.В.Сагадеева*. Москва: Марджани, 3.

socio-psychological aspect of the authoritarianism of Muslim philosophers is the desire to stand out from the masses, in their sense of superiority over the dark masses[1].

Particular attention deserves Ghazali's skepticism as an independent aspect of his work. The philosopher considered skepticism as one of the methods of cognition, that is, skepticism had an independent status in his theory of knowledge, irrespective of al-Ghazali's relation to philosophy. Any system of anti-authoritarianism is a phenomenon of freedom of the cognitive spirit. However, this freedom exists within certain limits. If previous classifiers considered al-Ghazali as representative of Ashʿarism or Shafi'ism, then this is only the result of the confrontation between dogmatical schools (mazhabs), each of whom would like to appropriate his thought and use the authority of his name to encourage new followers.

Al-Ghazali is aware of the significance of the Qur'an is dogmatic. Outside the community, the Scriptures are powerless, because it does not convince gentiles. The goal of the philosopher is to consolidate the experience of Sufi contemplation, what transforms the word into a symbol of self-assertive knowledge. Therefore, when he determines the qualities of the thinkers of the highest rank, calling them 'people of the inner mind', he sees their peculiarity in the fact that they begin with self-observation, then pass to contemplation of all things and see the handwriting is not Arabic, not Syrian, not Jewish, but Divine[2].

The philosopher comes from an understanding of faithfulness as the essential knowledge, the basis of noble behaviour as the only true and obligatory. He tries to highlight the value of the ethical ideal as the necessary basis for human perfection, besides not imposing on all the task of perfection. People must follow their own to improve[3]. Otherwise, this would only mean naive and blind adherence to the dogma. It is worth noting that such a feature denotes that he tried to achieve an existentially-cognitive and ethical harmonization of the human relationship with being.

Another essential feature of al-Ghazali's philosophical manner is the rejection of doctrine. Criticizing the definition of the doctrine, al-Ghazali shows the ideological blindness of those who adhere to 'doctrinal purity'. The essence of their activities is to trivially search for differences between authorities. Therefore, the person who was born in a Mutʿazilite, Ashʿarite or other environment is accustomed to the blind imitation of founder's ideas of these schools, and in the future, as a rule, it turns out to be fanatically against another doctrine. Al-Ghazali considers such a phenomenon in all three religion of the Scriptures. He colligates doctrinal fanaticism with the function of socio-political direction and sees it as a means to make humble dark masses, and since it is difficult to cause its activity without an obvious leader, then fanaticism becomes the most appropriate means.

Defining doctrine as a sectarian outlook emphasizes authoritarianism and hypertrophy of the ideological basis. The thinker comes to formulation the task of avoiding turns in the direction of doctrine and go in search of truth through his own vision in order to become the master of doctrine. He proclaims doctrinal pluralism, making skepticism the necessary means of comprehending the truth. In accordance, salvation is not in the following up of authority, but salvation – in independence and self-determination. The top of this approach is its denial of the validity of 'general agreement' (ijma, جمع) as inadequate truth[4]. He relies on the mind liberated by the Sufi enlightenment (ishraq, إشراق) and the symbolic interpretation (tawil, تأويل)[5], what he calls the gradual elucidation of the meaning in which the autonomy of thought is realized in the freedom of relation to the object of the investigation. Throughout his life, al-Ghazali remained faithful to the critical mind, proclaiming the necessity for a permanent ijtihad (إجتِهَاد). Thus, it should be said that the characteristic features of his philosophizing, in general, include the possibility of achieving happiness, and its components are precisely the rejection of the blind imitation, true knowledge without fanaticism and authoritarianism, as well as the aspirations toward the Absolute.

---

[1] Al-Ghazali (2014). *Al-Iqtisad fi Al-l'tiqad* [Moderation in Belief]. Translated with an Interpretive Essay and Notes by Aladdin M. Yaqub. *The Internet Archive*
<https://ia801206.us.archive.org/24/items/ModerationInBeliefIqtisadFiAlItiqadByGhazali/Moderation%20in%20belief%20%28Iqtisad%20fi%20alitiqad%29%20by%20Ghazali.pdf> (2017, June, 14).

[2] Аль-Джанаби, М.М. (2010). *Теология и философия ал-Газали*. Москва: Марджани.

[3] Al-Ghazali (2017). *Ayyuhal-Walad*. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society.

[4] Аль-Газали (2010*). Избавляющий от заблуждения. Из Средневековая арабо-мусульманская философия в переводах А.В.Сагадеева*. Москва: Марджани, 3.

[5] Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (2004). *The Holy Qur'an*. Translated by Maulawi Sher 'Ali.
<https://www.alislam.org/quran/Holy-Quran-English.pdf>, 3:5-7. (2018, June, 14).

So in his works the author suggests to think independently, and in life – independently strive for self-perfection and approach to the Absolute. We can feel the application of critical thinking and the logical method to the question of the knowledge of transcendental, unknowable things in his writings "The Niche of Lights" and "The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God".

During his life, as evidenced by thinker's work, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali devoted a lot of attention to the problem of rational knowledge of the transcendental, Veiled, hidden (al-ghayb, الغَيب)[1], that is, those subjects and things that formed the basis not only of speculative thinking in the period of the Arab-Islamic Middle Ages, but also of the whole Islamic worldview. It was about subjects that are not part of the usual range of ordinary human experience – not that which is a product of interaction with the material environment, nor the result of introspection. In this regard, God and all that is associated with Him are the first and the main subject of the investigation, against which it is unacceptable to make a mistake.

Gradually, on this issue in the Arab-Islamic speculative thought of the Middle Ages, several positions were formed, the poles, to which thinkers gravitated. The first pole – the position that implies knowledge about God is mediated, derivative and speculative (al-nazari)[2]. Such an interpretation was characteristic, for example, for the predecessor of al-Ghazali – Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, who divided knowledge (al-ilm, علم) with the 'necessary' (ilm daruri) and 'acquired' (ilm mukatasab). The necessary knowledge, according to al-Ghazali himself, it imposes itself on the human mind – in the sense that, firstly, this knowledge is obtained without the active and cognitive efforts of a person, and on the second, it is not in doubt[3].

The list of types of al-Ghazali's reliable knowledge can provide representation of the necessary knowledge. This is primary knowledge, a sort of axioms like assertion: "I exist", "two more than one"; introspective observations as "I am hungry", "I am scared"; perception of external organs of sense such as "snow is white", "the moon is round"; experienced knowledge such as "fire burns", "stones fall down"; knowledge received by a number of reliable re-speakers, the first of which received it directly as "Makkah exists"[4].

Knowledge of God was, according to al-Ghazali, otherwise, a derivative type of knowledge, and thus envisaged the possibility and necessity for appropriate theoretical, speculative searches that take place under certain rules. We can see the above features of his philosophizing in philosopher's understanding that knowledge of God (the Transcendental and the Veiled) cannot be included to the type of necessary, that is, absolutely undoubted knowledge.

Another pole of the interpretation of knowledge of God (transcendental) is the assertion that such knowledge is given ready. The position was characterized by the variability of approaches. One option of 'ready knowledge' is it is given by the Authorities, be it God, the Prophet Muhammad or the Shiite's imams. It is believed that the authority has already said everything and its language is fixed (the words of God in the Quran, Muhammad's words – in the hadiths, Imams in the Isma'ilites themselves are the Word) and the believer only needs to understand what has already been said. This approach implies completely denying possibility of theorizing in any form. Al-Ghazali, for example, criticizes the Ismailites for their belief in the fact that knowledge of the Divine can be obtained not through rational cognition, but from the Imams. It testifies to one of the features of his philosophical manner. The second version of the justification of the ready knowledge is a pretension to the possibility of direct knowledge of the transcendent from the very transcendent through the inclusion of this knowledge into direct individual experience[5]. This is the position of the Sufi mystics, who are supposed to receive knowledge directly from God.

---

[1] Al-Ghazali (1998). *Mishkat Al-Anwar*. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press.

[2] Hikmet, Y. (2011). Prophetic Niche in the Virtuous City: The Concept of Hikmah in Early Islamic Thought. *GOOGLE BOOKS* <https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Prophetic_Niche_in_the_Virtuous_City.html?id= iN8zDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y> (2018, June, 14).

[3] Abrahamov, B. (1993). Necessary knowledge in Islamic Theology. *In Britih Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 20, 1,* 20-32. *Academia.edu* <http://www.academia.edu/25299731/Necessary_Knowledge_in_Islamic_ Theology> (2018, June, 14).

[4] Weiss, B. (1985). Knowledge of the Past: the Theory of Tawatur according to Ghazali. In *Studia Islamica, 61,* 81-105. *JSTOR* <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1595409?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents> (2018, June, 14).

[5] Ибн Араби (1995). Мекканские откровения. СПб: Центр Петербургское Востоковедение, 36. *ПЛАТОНАНЕТ* <http://platona.net/load/knigi_po_filosofii/istorija_filosofii_arabskaja/ibn_al_arabi_mekkanskie_otkrovenija_al_futuk hat_al_makkijja/59-1-0-3169> (2018, June, 14).

The philosophers who belonged to the peripatetic tradition had their own independent view on this question. Their epistemological intension was not in the prevailing, priority or exclusive knowledge of God or in comprehension of the transcendental as Divine, but in the follow up of an investigation of full-fledged being. There was a place and for Creator.

Should be said that there are objects that are not accessible to direct human perception. First, it is God, its essence and properties. Al-Ghazali often gives examples of death, paradise and hell[1]. The inability to cognize these categories is explained very simple: they can only be known after death. However, people use these names, having a certain idea about them. The names attract the thinker's attention. We are in the semantic field of the book "The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God".

Al-Ghazali postulates the triple existence of things. In explaining the definition and essential reality of the name, we say that things have existence as individuals, in speech, or in minds. Existence as individuals is the fundamental real existence, while existence in the mind is cognitional, formal existence; and existence in speech is verbal and indicative. First, as separate and concrete subjects; secondly, in consciousness, or in reason; thirdly, in the speech. The first existence is basic and valid, the second is cognitive-formal, and the third is expressive-sign. For example, heaven exists by itself, besides, it exists in our minds and souls, because it is reflected in the visual and imagination, and even if the sky disappears from our field of vision, it is present in our imagination. This image, representation (sura) is expressed in knowledge (ilm); it is an idea, an image or a likeness of a known one (mysal). An analogy is the reflected image in the mirror: there is an isomorphism between this image in the mirror and the image existing outside the mirror. Finally, the sky exists as some linguistic expression consisting of sounds[2].

There is nothing in the language, what does not exist initially in reality. He also says, "A proposition is a sign of that is in the mind; that what is in consciousness is the image of the existing, what coincides with that one what exists. In addition, if there was no existence in reality, the image would not be reflected in the mind; and if it would not be reflected in the mind, it would not be felt by a person; but if a person did not feel it, then it would not have been expressed in speech"[3]. Thus, there are three different subjects: proposition, knowledge, knowledgeable (the object of knowledge, which is, actually existing).

An important detail is the al-Ghazali's postulate of unchanging of two existences in space and time – the real existence and existence in consciousness, that is, a certain particular object (for example, heaven) is unchangeable in reality during the time and for different people, so its image in consciousness is the same. As for speech (and writing), the existence of an object changes with the change of epochs and peoples.

The philosopher is occupied with a 'expressive-sign' of the existence of things. He comes to the idea that the proposition can become part of reality. Hereof he is convinced by the fact that there are first-order propositions, then the second-order propositions describing the previous ones, etc. Thus, the propositions after becoming pronounced also became existing in reality – as separate concrete objects, and their images were engraved in consciousness; and thus became worthy of the fact that they also found expression in the speech.

Reflecting on affirmative and objectionable propositions, he gives an example of an angel. If one wants, for example, to find out whether the angel is eternal or created, he must first find out the meaning of the expression 'angel', then the meaning of the statements 'eternal' and 'created', after that – to consider the conformity or inconsistency one of these properties in relation to the angel[4]. For the thinker an angel, of course, exists[5]. To clarify the question, he modifies somewhat the scheme of triple existence of things: first, in reality there is a God characterized by eternity in his loneliness and his properties; secondly, in consciousness, or in minds, there are some things created or those that arose in time as much as such (arising in time) are the minds themselves; thirdly, in the speech there are names that have arisen in time as speech itself is not eternal, arose in time.

For the thinker, it's important that there are special names in the speech, which are not time-based, do not arise in time, but exist forever. These are the names of God. Of course, the question remains open: how can a person still know what is inaccessible to direct perception? However, just eternal names of God make it possible to know God, albeit incompletely.

---

[1] Al-Ghazali (2015). *Al-Maqsad al-asna fi sharh asma Allah al-husna*. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 149.

[2] Там само.

[3] Там само, 6-7.

[4] Там само, 6.

[5] Al-Ghazali. (1998). *Mishkat Al-Anwar*. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press.

According to al-Ghazali, there are two ways of knowing God: one is closed to man, the other is imperfect. The first way is that the servant of God should wait when he has the properties of the Lord and he will become Lord. In any case, such an aspiration can be understood: according to al-Ghazali, only God can know God – just as the Prophet can know only the Prophet himself or another man possessing the gift of prophecy. Man can only know what is human. In other words, each person is only given the knowledge of himself.

Here it is worth draw attention to the second path of knowledge of God. This imperfect way consists in that the names of God or the names of its properties, to liken them to what we know about ourselves. The use of the concept of at-Tashbih, which means the likeness of God to his creation, is unacceptable sin for a Muslim, but it helps us to understand the innovativeness and resoluteness of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali[1].

This knowledge is imperfect because of number of reasons. First, it is clear that God can possess and, obviously, possesses such properties, analogues of which man can not have. Secondly, whereas for a Muslim a God or his individual properties can not be in the full sense of human beings, admissible assimilation, for obvious reasons, is not so much limited as self-denying. It is in the literal sense to always be confined to the expression that nothing is like Him; He is alive, but not like living beings, He is mighty, but not so living beings.

So, summing up, it should be said that for al-Ghazali it is important to emphasize the inner opposite of the cognition of the unknowable what is not achievable to man. For him the three propositions are equivalent: first, "I do not know God" (God only knows God himself); secondly, "I know God" (since I know myself as a separate and inexact image of God); third, "I do not know anything except God" (because God is present in everything what is only in the world – as his Creator)[2]. However, the author also pursues the moral purpose – knowledge of the properties of God promotes the fact that a person receives turning point. It has the ability to achieve what it is impossible to achieve – to resemble God in his 'morality', properties, including generosity, humility, and mercy, and others like that. A total of 99 such properties, what refer to the Great Names of God, but it is clear that such self-similarity is also self-denial. The principle of self-refutation of self-similarity is used by the thinker not only in relation to human qualities, but also in relation to the whole world. By this logic, the Veiled is a separate world, what is supposed to know rationally, knowing the human world and projecting the results of this knowledge into a transcendent, already described in units of human language – in Text (Qur'an, Sunna).

Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to consider the concept of the two worlds of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, referring to the work "The Niche of Lights." The thinker suggests the existence of a comprehensive universe, which combines two worlds: -alam al-mulk wa-sh-shagada (عالم المُلك وَ الشّهادة), that is, the world of the earthly kingdom and what we are observing, and alam al-gaib wa-l-malakut (عالم الغيب و الملكوت)- the world of the hidden realms and the kingdom of God, or the visible and tangible reality and the invisible and the immaterial reality[3].

Couples of these worlds can also be understood through opposition. One pair of mutually contrasted concepts is al-gaib (veiled) and as-shagada (visible); another pair – al-mulk (earthly kingdom) and al-malakut (God's kingdom). And the worlds themselves form a mutually opposite pair – the world of the earthly kingdom that we observe and the hidden world of the kingdom of God.

We can find the descriptive characteristics that the author gives to the two worlds in the "Niche of Lights". For example, the world of the earthly kingdom that we observe is bodily, sensual, lower, and also low. The hidden world of God's Kingdom, on the contrary, appears to be spiritual, intelligible, upward and exalted. In relation to the veiled world of the kingdom of God, the concept of the Lord's presence is also used, it is also called the world of holiness (alam al-kudsi,عالم القدس) and the fence of holiness, and 'the Garden' (العالم الجنة)[4].

The earthly world that we can observe is an analogy of the hidden world of God's kingdom. We can state the connection of the worlds. Since we are in a categorical field determined by Muslim dogmas, it is not surprising that the veiled world is the main determinant, priority in relation to the world we are observing. There is a connection, according to the thinker, parallelism, imitation between the worlds.

---

[1] Al-Ghazali (2015). *Al-Maqsad al-asna fi sharh asma Allah al-husna*. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society.
[2] Там само, 46.
[3] Al-Ghazali. (1998). *Mishkat Al-Anwar*. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 26.
[4] Там само, 35.

Al-Ghazali also says about the balance between the worlds, the correspondence between them, some similarity, some coincidence, resemblance and, finally, the relation[1].

The earthly world that we observe represents a set of hints (مِثَالٌ، أَمْثِلَةٌ)[2], the correct interpretation of which allows one to know not only this world itself, but also the hidden world of God's kingdom, as all subjects, processes, connections, relations of the observing world are allusions to the hidden world. In addition, the earth's world is a kind of mirror system, in which some subjects are reflected in others, explained by others. Man, using his mind, can cognize the secrets of the hidden world.

In this case rational knowledge of the transcendent is possible only on the basis of the interpretation of available allusions for human. The first group of hints is the hints of the Scriptures. In this case, it is necessary to use at-tawil – rational, or symbolic, interpretation. Another group represents veiled hints what a person receives through dreams. The interest and reference of al-Ghazali to the interpretation process of dreams is explained by the fact that it is close to the prophetic vision in the sense of transcendental comprehension, inaccessible to man in a state of cheerfulness, when the body senses distract the human soul from contact with higher spirits. Other hints can be grouped as those that are available in all subjects, phenomena, rapports, relationships of the available world to a person – the world of the earthly kingdom. In general, we can say that a person in its essence is a hint to the world in its completeness.

Thus, the knowledge of God afforded by theology, philosophy, and law is based upon the rational interpretation of the divine wisdom found in the Qur'an and hadith. This type of knowledge is gained and perfected through the rational faculty of the mind; its acquisition is not directly dependent upon the morality and inner goodness of a person. That is why al-Ghazali considers that Sufism demands the whole person – not just the mental manipulation of ideas. The knowledge of God that Sufi discipline imparts is dependent on the quality of a person's being or the state of an individual's soul. If we resort to the interpretation of al-Ghazali's ideas, then the process of rational cognition of a transcendental consists in reading-decoding-interpretation of the Divine Word, which is presented in the hints of the Scriptures, the human world and dreams. Person has to make efforts to get up from the interpretations of hints to the 'Divine Writer'[3] who sends and creates these hints.

References:

1. Abrahamov, B. (1993). Necessary knowledge in Islamic Theology. In *Britih Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 20, 1,* 20-32 <http://www.academia.edu/25299731/Necessary_Knowledge_in_Islamic_Theology> [In English]. (2018, June, 14).
2. Al'-Dzhanabi, M. (2010). *Teologija I filosofija al'-Gazali* [Al-Ghazali's Theology and Philosophy]. Moscow: Mardzhani. [In Russian].
3. Al-Ghazali (1998). *Mishkat Al-Anwar* [The Niche of Lights]. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press. [Bilingual English-Arabic text].
4. Al-Ghazali (1924). *Mishkat Al-Anwar* [The Niche for Lights]. New Delhi, India: Kitab Bhavan. [In English].
5. Al-Ghazali (2015). *Al-Maqsad al-asna fi sharh asma Allah al-husna* [The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God]. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society. [In English].
6. Al-Ghazali (2017). *Ayyuhal-Walad* [Letter to a Disciple]. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society. [Bilingual English-Arabic text].
7. Al-Ghazali (2016). *Kitab Riyadat al-nafs and Kitab Kasr al-ahahwatayn. Ihya ulum al-din* [On Disciplining the Soul on Breaking the Two Desires. Books XXII and XXIII of the Revival of the Religious Sciences]. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society. [In English].
8. Al'-Gazali (2010). Izbavljajushhij ot zabluzhdenija [Deliverance from Error]. *Srednevekovaja arabo-musul'manskaja filosofija v perevodah A.V. Sagadeeva* [Medieval Muslim Philosophy in Translations by Artur V. Sagadeev]. Moscow: Mardzhani, 99-140. [In Russian].
9. Al-Ghazali (1964). Mishkat al-anwar [The Niche of Lights. Edited by Abu al-'ala 'Afifi]. Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiya lil-Tab'a wa al-Nashr, *Al-Ghazali website.* < https://www.ghazali.org/books/mishkat-afifi.pdf > [In Arabic]. (2018, June, 14).
10. Al-Ghazali (2014). Al-Iqtisad fi Al-I'tiqad [Moderation in Belief]. *The Internet Archive* <https://ia801206.us.archive.org/24/items/ModerationInBeliefIqtisadFiAlItiqadByGhazali/Moderation%20in%20belief%20%28Iqtisad%20fi%20al-itiqad%29%20by%20Ghazali.pdf> [In English]. (2018, June, 14).

---

[1] Там само.

[2] Там само, 25.

[3] Al-Ghazali (2015). *Al-Maqsad al-asna fi sharh asma Allah al-husna*. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society.

11. Al-Ghazali (2003). Stating That Sagginess in Seeking Bliss is Akin to Absurdity. In Al- Ghazali. *Mizan al-'Ammal* [Criterion of Action]. *Al-Ghazali website*. Cairo: Dar al-Marraif Press, 180-181. <http://ghazali.org/works/mizan-en.htm > [In English]. (2018, June, 14).

12. Al-Ghazali (2003). Stating That the Road to Felicity is Knoweledge and Action. In Al-Ghazali. Mizan al-'Ammal *Al-Ghazali website*. Cairo: Dar al-Marraif Press, 194-197. <http://ghazali.org/works/mizan-en2.htm> [In English]. (2018, June, 14).

13. Griffel, F. (2009). *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*. Oxford University Press. <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JxFtE9uEAHkC&dq=Griffel+F.+al-ghazali%27s&hl=ru&source=gbs_navlinks_s> [In English]. (2018, June, 14).

14. Hikmet, Y. (2011). *Prophetic Niche in the Virtuous City: The Concept of Hikmah in Early Islamic Thought*. Leiden-Boston. *GOOGLE BOOKS* <https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Prophetic_Niche_in_the_Virtuous_City.html?id=iN8zDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y > [In English]. (2018, June, 14).

15. Ibn Arabi (1995). Izobrazhenie okruzhnostej, ohvatyvajushhih podobie cheloveka Tvorcu i sotvorennomu miru. [The Image of the Circles, Covering a Person Similar to the Creator and the Created World]. *Mekkanskie otkrovenija.* [Meccan revelations]. Sankt-Peterburg: Centr. Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie. <http://platona.net/load/knigi_po_filosofii/istorija_filosofii_arabskaja/ibn_al_arabi_mekkanskie_otkrovenija_al_futukhat_al_makkijja/59-1-0-3169> [In Russian]. (2018, June, 14).

16. Smirnov, A. (2001). *Logika smysla: Teorija i ee prilozhenie k analizu klassicheskoj arabskoj filosofii i kul'tury* [Logic of Sense: Theory and Its Application in the Analysis of Classical Arabic Philosophy and Culture]. Moscow: Jazyki slavjanskoj kul'tury. [In Russian].

17. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (2004). *The Holy Qur'an.* Translated by Maulawi Sher 'Ali. <https://www.alislam.org/quran/Holy-Quran-English.pdf> [Bilingual Arabic-English text]. (2018, June, 14).

18. Weiss, B. (1985). Knowledge of the Past: the Theory of Tawatur according to Ghazali. *Studia Islamica, 61,* 81-105 *JSTOR* <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1595409?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents > [In English]. (2018, June, 14).