

## PARTICULAR ISSUES OF PHILOSOPHY

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### THE DISCOURSES OF FEAR AND HORROR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LATE XX – EARLY XXI

The author begins the article introducing the notion “phobial turn”. This concept reflects the crucial reorientation of the contemporary human consciousness as to the problem of fear. Namely, the increasing of “phobial turn” in the second half of XX – early XXI ct allows defining some of its laws. One of them is the gradual superseding of the “fear” category by that of “horror”. The article presents both phenomena of fear and horror in the interpretation of contemporary philosophers such as F. Aries, N. Carroll, J. Kristeva, L. Svendsen and P. Slaughterdyke. It is shown that the philosophical thought abandons the negative attitude to the phenomenon of horrible and its equation with the disgusting, and embraces ambivalent image of horrible, stressing its positive aspect. We analyze both optimistic attempts of finding effective anti-phobial practices on the new social level and the pessimistic prognosis as to the cynical modern human being’s abilities of defying horror.

**Key words:** «phobia turn» in philosophy, fear, horror, anti-phobia practices, art-horror.

Fear “of something” or “for somebody” is an important part of the human condition. As M. Heidegger stated, “The selfsameness rather only serves to show that the essence of dread is Dasein itself”<sup>1</sup>. Correspondingly, the traditional human culture can be seen, essentially, as a system of fear-defying practices. This anti-phobial emphasis is most clearly seen in the cultures of Ancient Greece and Middle Ages. But since XIX ct. culture, including philosophical culture, starts the re-orientation that can be defined as the “phobial turn”. It means the cardinal change of the attitude to fear from negative to positive and the consequent development of the phobial practices in both philosophy and art. This process increases, and as a result in the late XX – early XXI ct. the phenomenon of the fear-inducing often manifest itself as horrible (in artistic images) and horror (in philosophy). That is why we aim at reviewing the discourses of fear and horror in some of the contemporary philosophic teachings.

The relevance of the theme is defined by the fact that one of the main aims of any society is finding and applying effective anti-phobial practices. This need is especially great in the societies that feel the pressure of real as well as virtual dangers. A person should meet the challenges of the contemporary world not only in the spheres of economy, politics, science, but also in their own mind, having definite theoretical, philosophical orientations.

The theoretical foundation of our work is comprised by the analyses of fear and horror, phobia and anti-phobia practices made by such XX – XXI ct. thinkers as W. Allen, R. Apresyan, S. Averintsev, V. Bachinin, M. Bakhtin, D. Barinov, W. Beck, M. Bonopart, L. Chesnokova, G. Chistyakova, Yu. Davidov, U. Eco, V. Erofeev, G. Faizova, O. Feldman, E. Fromm, F. Furedi, L. Gorokhova, S. Grabovs’ky, V. Grishaev, E. Grossman, M. Heidegger, N. Khamitov, E. Kossak, G. Krapivnik, J. Kristeva, M. Kultaeva, M. Nemtsev, S. Proleev, F. Riman, V. Sabirov, I. Sapozhnikova, J.-P. Sartre, L. Svendsen, L. Shestov, M. Stolyar, A. Vetlesen, V. Zhivanova, S. Zhizhek, S. Zelins’ky and others. Namely in this article we concentrate on the essays of five contemporary thinkers – J. Kristeva’s “The powers of horror. Essay on disgust” (“Pouvoirs de l’horreur: essai sur l’abjection”), N. Carroll’s “Philosophy of horror or the paradoxes of the heart”, L. Svendsen’s “Philosophy of fear”, F. Aries’s “Man before the face of death” (“L’Homme devant la mort”) and P. Sloterdijk’s “Critique of Cynical Reason”. The choice is defined by their different but interconnected content and by the considerable influence of the authors on the philosophical and esthetical discourse of the late XX – early XXI ct.

The object of our research is the philosophical and esthetical analysis of the phenomena of fear and

<sup>1</sup> Heidegger, M. (1985). *The structure of uncanniness*. Indiana University Press Bloomington, 293.

horror in the XX–XXI ct. philosophy. The subject is the philosophic-esthetic explications of phenomena of fearful and horrible in the named essays. The novelty of our approach to the theme is the result of the comparative analysis of works of contemporary Western philosophers in the aspect of the phenomena of fear and horror. This study leads to the conclusion about the new understanding of the ambivalence of these phenomena. The perspective of the study is researching the fantasy, because the inner ontology of this genre almost ideally reifies some of the contemporary philosophical and esthetical reflections.

Studying the discourses of fear and horror in the contemporary (late XX – early XXI ct.) esthetics, we should begin with the dynamics of the corresponding problems in the XIX – XX ct. philosophy, where the problem field was defined for the first time. That is why the research of the contemporary “phobiology” specifics should be preceded by the brief description of the basis of the further investigation of the discourse of fear. E. Grossman, for example, states that the source of the contemporary “fear philosophy” can be traced back to the works of Hegel<sup>1</sup>. It is Hegel’s dialectics that leads him to the conclusion of the positive role of fear as a feeling that allows person understanding of themselves on the very edge of their existence<sup>2</sup>. S. Kierkegaard furthered the philosophic “phobial accent”. On one hand, he returned to the medieval interpretation of fear’s ambivalence (negative fear as a result of the Fall and the positive fear – the religious awe). On the other hand, his philosophy is characterized by the principally new “optics of fear”, when this phenomenon takes central parts in the philosophical discourse, which is definitely not the case with the medieval Christian tradition.

F. Nietzsche goes in the opposite direction when he denies the anti-phobial meaning of Christian religion and philosophy, and makes the philosophy itself extremely dangerous.

The concepts of fear and horror take an important part in the metaphysics of M. Heidegger. The philosopher defines fear as a feeling induced by something definite and real, while horror is bound to the unknown, unexpected and undefined. If a danger is unknown, than fear turns into trepidation. If trepidation is accompanied by the factor of the unexpected, than fear turns into horror<sup>3</sup>. Thus horror is a manifestation of the essentially in-definite character of human existence. That is why horror, according to Heidegger, can lead to transcending the empirical reality and approaching eternity. A like thought was expressed by J.-P. Sartre, who also sees fear as a way of understanding freedom.

K. Jaspers and Ch. Yannaras as the representatives of the “religious existentialism” propose a cardinaly different conception. They believe that contemporary person lives in the conditions that had annihilated all the basic human values in the soul. This causes the inexpressible longing for the real existence, from which a modern person is separated. It leads to the mounting feeling of the horrible emptiness and futility, to anxiety and fear. K. Jaspers proposes the following anti-phobial practices: first of all a person must realize their freedom and achieve a new level of communication, the essence of which is love of other people and of God. According to Jaspers, only love can defy boredom, anxiety and fear.

Thus the representatives of the existential philosophy see fear and horror as the experiences that reveal the real meaning of person’s existence. Quite different understanding of fear and horror is to be found in the Psychoanalytical tradition, that is represented by the number of contemporary thinkers.

The new page in the studying the phenomena of fear and disgust was opened by the philosophers of the late XX – early XXI ct. J. Kristeva in “The powers of horror: essay on disgust” interprets horror by means of esthetic category of disgust. She thinks that disgust has something of the irrepressible and grim rebellion of a person against the things that frighten, that threaten, both outer and inner, on the other side of the possible, acceptable, even thinkable<sup>4</sup>. If we accept this point of view, we can define horror via disgust. Thus it is seen as a kind of nauseous reaction to a threat to our life, health or well-being. Horror is the strong disgust of extremely dangerous (deadly) things. As a bout of nausea leads me away and preserves me from filth, sewage, excrement<sup>5</sup>, so horror warns about possible death (natural, social, personal non-being). The author uses S. Freud’s notion that, in accordance with the notion of suppression, Freud introduces for studying neurosis the notion of refusal, and for defining psychosis – the notion of rejection<sup>6</sup>. As we see, J. Kristeva thinks that phobias have no other object besides disgust<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Гроссман, Э.А. (1967). *Заметки о понятии страха в современной философии*. <<http://refoteka.ru/r-1147.html>>.

<sup>2</sup> Гроссман, Э.А. (1967). *Заметки о понятии страха в современной философии*. <<http://refoteka.ru/r-1147.html>>.

<sup>3</sup> Хайдеггер, М. (1997). *Бытие и время*. Москва: Ad Marginem, 142.

<sup>4</sup> Kristeva, J. (1980). *Pouvoirs de l'horreur: essai sur l'abjection*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 36.

<sup>5</sup> Kristeva, J. (1980). *Pouvoirs de l'horreur: essai sur l'abjection*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 37.

<sup>6</sup> Kristeva, J. (1980). *Pouvoirs de l'horreur: essai sur l'abjection*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 42.

<sup>7</sup> Kristeva, J. (1980). *Pouvoirs de l'horreur: essai sur l'abjection*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 41.

J. Kristeva names literature as the art form where disgust – and, consequently, horror – can be expressed most comprehensively<sup>1</sup>. N. Carroll differs, centering his attention on the cinema.

N. Carroll – an American esthetic and cinema theoretician – is widely known in the West by his book “Philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart”. The main object of his research is the “art-horror”. This kind of horror he defines in the terms of an artistic form: the “art-horror” is everything that can frighten viewer or reader as a subject of a work of art virtual reality<sup>2</sup>. N. Carroll seeks means of making the horror genre even more frightening, turning it really terrible. So he aims at understanding the meaning of horror as an esthetical feeling and finding means of achieving this feeling in the art practices. As we see, the phenomenon of fear interests him not in its anti-phobial aspect, but, on the contrary – as a way of developing different forms of art-horror, enriching it with new terrible plots.

N. Carroll, as well as J. Kristeva, includes in the structure of the horrible the component of “disgusting”. But he does not equate horrible and disgusting. Horror is not reduced to disgust. He thinks that the nauseating feeling of disgust is something that amplifies the feeling of fear<sup>3</sup>, catalyzing the turning of fear into horror. The components of the “art-horror” are fear, disgust and suspense<sup>4</sup>. Striving to explain its attraction for the recipient, this author sees horror as an ambivalent feeling, combining disgust with its opposition - attraction. As well as J. Kristeva, he uses the Psychoanalytical methodology, but his aim is to understand why people again and again return to the “art-horror” and find in such artifacts a kind of satisfaction.

Primarily, N. Carroll wants to answer the question, how it is possible to be frightened of something that does not exist. He tries to understand how can real horror be induced by non-existent monsters and other “unreal” horrible things. The phenomenon of fear of non-existent things he calls the paradox of fiction<sup>5</sup>. N. Carroll explains this paradox in the following way: immersing ourselves in the atmosphere of art-horror, we internally start living not our real life where we know that there are no monsters, but partially put our perception into the world of fiction, where we can believe in existence of impossible things. And when we partially believe in them, we start fearing them. At the same time, we can't fully believe in them, and thus we can't be really afraid. That's why the author proposes to substitute the word “believe” by the expression “willing suspension of disbelief”<sup>6</sup>.

From our own point of view this phenomenon can be seen as a specifically phenomenological reduction of dis-belief. A person suspends the dis-belief, playing the mind games of “make-pretend belief”. So, knowing that watching a horror film or reading a horror novel, is not dangerous, the fans of the genre turn to it for enjoyment of the “danger without real danger”. N. Carroll considers this the real reason of the genre's attraction. He calls this combination of attraction and horror the “second paradox of the heart”, the essence of which is people's want to be frightened<sup>7</sup>. In this way the philosophic thought comes to the ambivalent image of the horrible, that includes not only disgust, but also its opposition – attraction. The positive aspect of the horrible is emphasized.

The next logical position is represented by the philosopher L. Svendsen, the author of “Philosophy of fear”. He finds several more arguments for the attraction of the horrible and possible positive results of using phobial practices. But the aim of his work is not the development of art-horror, but on the contrary, achievement of freedom from the “culture of fear”<sup>8</sup>. L. Svendsen tries to solve a number of problems: what is fear? How it begins? How it manifests itself and influences our life? What function does it have? The author characterizes his urge to study these problems as a result of “increasing irritation at the colonization of our life-world by fear”<sup>9</sup>.

L. Svendsen is also known as the author of “Philosophy of boredom”. To some extent, the analysis of the phenomenon of boredom lead him to the investigation of the contemporary phobias. The author states that “fear is not simply something we are exposed to against our will; it is often also something we

<sup>1</sup> Kristeva, J. (1980). *Pouvoirs de l'horreur: essai sur l'abjection*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 243.

<sup>2</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 22.

<sup>4</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 91.

<sup>5</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 159.

<sup>6</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 66.

<sup>7</sup> Carroll, N. (2004). *The philosophy of horror or paradoxes of the heart*. New York and London: Routledge, 83.

<sup>8</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). *A Philosophy of Fear*. *Reaktion Books*, 7.

<sup>9</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). *A Philosophy of Fear*. *Reaktion Books*, 7.

voluntarily expose ourselves to in an attempt to transcend a banal everyday existence”<sup>1</sup>. L. Svendsen states the oppositions of fear and boredom and the essentiality of their mutual negation. In this context he reveals the entertaining function of fear, when a person is immersed in fear there is no place for boredom<sup>2</sup>. Any manifestation of life has these two aspects: fear and boredom. They are connected by their very opposition, and each of them can cause the other<sup>3</sup>. In the chapter “Attraction of Fear” the philosopher characterizes the world as it would be without fear, and call such a world mortally dull<sup>4</sup>. According to Svendsen fear “lends colour to the world”<sup>5</sup>. The question is why are we attracted to the negative esthetics when there is a number of ways of having positive feelings. The authors introduces the term “fear by proxy”, meaning that a person is ready to feel fear only on condition of being able to control it (extreme sports with the safety precautions, cinema horror etc)<sup>6</sup>.

L. Svendsen stresses that our fears are mostly not based on the personal experience. Moreover, quiet and safe life causes anxiety about the potential dangers. That’s why the philosopher sees fears and horrors as a by-product of the stability and well-being of the modern society (the book was published in 1990)<sup>7</sup>.

L. Svendsen tries to formulate the definition of human fear. For him it is a kind of cultural habit<sup>8</sup>. Biologically speaking, the mechanisms of fear-inducement are the same in a human being and in an animal. But an animal lives in the natural environment and reacts only on the real danger. For example, a hare is not afraid of a predator that lives on another continent. But a human being, having consciousness and imagination, is able to share personal negative experience with other people and preserve the sum of the horrors, experiences by all the humanity in the course of all history. It can be added that modern person is privy to the information from all the countries and continents, and this information is mostly comprised of the news about catastrophes, murders, terrorism etc<sup>9</sup>.

Fear can’t be reduced to the physiological processes, such as the increasing heartbeat, hyperventilation, shiver. Fear always has the intentional object, it is always aimed at something. In its turn, the intentional object always undergoes a kind of interpretation. The difference between fear and other emotions that can have similar manifestations lies in the concrete interpretation<sup>10</sup>. The same object or thing irritates one person, frightens another and has no effect on still another one. L. Svendsen suggests differentiating fear and anxiety as M. Heidegger differentiated fear and horror: fear has a concrete object, and anxiety hasn’t one<sup>11</sup>.

The philosopher connects the category of fear with the notions of trust and suspicion. He states that fear and desire to gain safety from potential dangers form suspicion, and suspicion in its turn induces fear. Thus fear returns to the person, amplified. The vicious circle is formed. That is why in the world of constant “danger-preventing” the future is defined by dangers and not by possibilities<sup>12</sup>. The author stresses the anti-phobial function of trust in human life. He states that without trust life would be, if not paralyzed, then substantially limited<sup>13</sup>. Trust is one of the main remedies against fear. Svendsen calls trust the “social glue” that unites separate people into a community<sup>14</sup>. He is quite optimistic about the future, as his rationalistic position leads him to believe that the scientific and technical progress has already solved many problems and is generally able to cope with the new challenges. Lars Svendsen concludes his work in the spirit of optimistic (based on the “titanic humanism”) philosophy: all we need is belief in human ability to try and overcome all the woes step by step, learn on the mistakes and create the better world<sup>15</sup>.

F. Aries in the book “Man before the face of death” («L’homme devant lamort”) sees the main source

<sup>1</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 74.

<sup>5</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 74.

<sup>6</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 88.

<sup>7</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 75.

<sup>8</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 21.

<sup>9</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 27.

<sup>10</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 33.

<sup>11</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 35.

<sup>12</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 68.

<sup>13</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*.

<sup>14</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 101.

<sup>15</sup> Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. *Reaktion Books*, 131.

of fear in the nature, that latter expressing itself in the attacks furious and unpredictable<sup>1</sup>. The necessity of overcoming fear underlies the urge to organize people's work, provide order and morality as the condition of peaceful common life<sup>2</sup>. But society as a system of anti-phobial practices still has weak spots: the weakest spots of this system of fortifications were sex and death, because here human culture was the development of nature. That's why both sex and death had to be always controlled by society<sup>3</sup>. F. Aries's position is cardinally different from Psychoanalysis. It is known that S. Freud saw the society's control over the sexual sphere as the cause of various phobias and neuroses. F. Aries, on the contrary, thinks that the modern society stopped "controlling" the borders between nature and human culture with the help of the sacred practices. This leads to the fear and terrible loneliness, especially before the face of death.

Considering the anti-phobial practices of XX ct., F. Aries comes to the conclusion about the principal cultural shift, seen, among other, in the changing attitude to death. The society gradually divests death of its public, sacred character, and reduces to nothing all the rituals. The society propagates such mode of behavior, as if death does not exist. Namely, it forces the relations of the deceased to abandon mourning<sup>4</sup>. Also society leaves terminally ill person alone with the terror<sup>5</sup>. Such anti-phobial practices free the healthy from the fear of death, but increase this fear for the dying. The fear of suffering and of the unknown is multiplied by the terrible loneliness of a person that sees everybody lying, saying insincere words and trying to terminate the communication as soon as possible. The communication of the dying or already dead and the community of the alive fades away with the disappearance of the custom of the last farewells and instructions<sup>6</sup>.

It can be added that a great part in these processes of "death elimination", described by F. Aries, is played by the entertaining art that conditions people to accept hedonistic practices and the "wisdom" of futility of alternative quest for the meaning of life. Such anti-phobial practices can be defines as forgetting practices. They are closely connected to the art-horror. Horror in the frame of the art discourse is also a form of forgetting real disasters and dangers. Besides forgetting, it induces the mechanism of suppression. Strong and kind-of-pleasant emotions caused by art-horror, temporarily suppress real problems in a person's mind.

F. Aries proposes the anti-phobial practices that aim not at "eliminating" death, but at "humanizing" it. It is necessary to accept the reality of death and not to be ashamed of it. It does not mean the return of belief in evil, but an attempt to unite death with happiness<sup>7</sup>.

F. Aries believes in the possibility of reification of "death humanization" anti-phobial practices, achieved by the combined efforts of the best representatives of humanities, who would understand the phobic essence of the contemporary death negation<sup>8</sup>. On the contrary, P. Sloterdijk doesn't see real possibilities of returning to the humanistic values: «Only in the form of derision and renunciation do references the ideals of a humane culture still seen bearable»<sup>9</sup>. The philosopher demonstrates that contemporary person's consciousness in all spheres of life is the cynical consciousness that exceeds all the horrors known to humanity, because it sums the «"bad experiences" of all times and lets only the prospectless uniformity of hard facts prevail»<sup>10</sup>. But this monotony really means gradual degradation: «cynicism guarantees the expanded reproduction of the past on the newest level of what is currently the

<sup>1</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 497.

<sup>2</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 497.

<sup>3</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 497.

<sup>4</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 473.

<sup>5</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 467.

<sup>6</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 470.

<sup>7</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992) *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия», 508.

<sup>8</sup> Арьес, Ф. (1992). *Человек перед лицом смерти*. Москва: Издательская группа «Прогресс» – «Прогресс – Академия».

<sup>9</sup> Sloterdijk, P. (1988). *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Andreas Huyssen, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 546.

<sup>10</sup> Sloterdijk, P. (1988). *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Andreas Huyssen, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 546.

worst»<sup>1</sup>. P. Sloterdijk writes about the process of relentless advance of the mass culture of horror. That's why the «prophecies of an imminent and manmade end of the world» are so popular: «with macabre fits of fear, the panicking subjectivisms rustle through the media and speak of the apocalypse...»<sup>2</sup>.

Coming to the conclusion, we can state that the research of fear and horror in the late XX – early XXI ct. philosophy is defined by the *ambivalent* attitude to these phenomena. Philosophical thought abandons the negative attitude to the phenomenon of the horrible and its equation with the disgusting, and embraces the ambivalent image of the horrible, that includes not only disgusting, but also its opposition – attractive. The positive aspect of the horrible is stressed. It activates attempts of finding effective anti-phobial practices on the new social level. This optimistic slogan is opposed by the generally pessimistic prognosis as to the possibilities of defying horror. Still this prognosis includes some vestiges of belief in the better perspectives.

If we try and find the artistic analogue to the fear and horror ontology, we come to the fantasy genre. Fantasy worlds are usually characterized by the binary opposition of Good and Evil, where Evil seems much stronger, and where the victory of Good demands great sacrifices, ultimate efforts and, on top of all that, the intervention of the almighty Chance. If we also take into consideration the thought of the modern Psychoanalytics that the common feature of different phobias is the regression to childhood, where a person subconsciously seeks shelter from different “adult” fears<sup>3</sup>, then it appears that fantasy is not only matches contemporary person's world image, but also provides adult's regression to childhood. It means that the infantile discourse together with the suppression of the empirical life anxieties by means of art-horror comprise the basis of the anti-phobial practices that make fantasy genre so attractive for the contemporary audience.

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<sup>2</sup> Sloterdijk, P. (1988). *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Andreas Huyssen, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 546.

<sup>3</sup> Зелинский, С.А. (2005). *Манипуляции массами и психоанализ*. <<http://psyfactor.org/lib/zel14.htm>>.